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While the debate about a post-racial society rages, our justice system
continues to operate in a way that is race-conscious. It seems as though
most of the discussion about race and the justice system concerns criminal
justice, juvenile justice, education, and immigration. But race-
consciousness also impacts family law. Nonetheless, the family law canon
does not scrutinize race-based disparities in laws, procedures, and
outcomes, and that omission feeds a mistaken notion of a race-blind or a
post-racial society. One consequence of this omission is that it obscures
race-based decision making by legislatures, judges, legal reform
organizations, legal scholars, lawyers, and child welfare workers, and
thereby immunizes race-based decision making from scrutiny. This Article
suggests that the family law canon inaccurately describes a race-neutral or
post-racial state for family law and that the canon should correct its
colorblindness so that legal authorities can address the problems that
structural racism creates for African-American families. Part I of this
Article explores the family law canon and some of the examples that legal
authorities and scholars constantly employ to minimize the distinctions that
family law currently makes on the basis of race. Part II disputes the
colorblind canonical story by showing that the law does not protect the
autonomy of African-American families as much as it does that of white
families. This section also explains why it matters that the family law canon
has it wrong with respect to African-American families: in short,
colorblindness immunizes racism and perpetuates inequality. Part III
discusses why family law scholars-both those who advocate color
consciousness and those who advocate colorblindness-tend to oversimplify
the precedent that addresses the role of race in family law. The Article
concludes by emphasizing the importance of legal scholarship that
challenges the family law canon and invites family law scholars to broaden
and challenge the canon.
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With Barack Obama's historic election to the Presidency of the United
States, public discourse has focused on the idea of a "post-racial" society, or
a "society in which race is no longer meaningful." 1 Ironically, the election
fueled enthusiastic debate about the arrival of a post-racial era in the United
States, while highly-racialized conflicts continue to dominate the public
consciousness. The infamous arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates,
1 Ralph Richard Banks, Beyond Colorblindness: Neo-Racialism and the Future of
Race and Law Scholarship, 25 HARv. BLAcKLETrER L.J. 41, 41 (2009); Ian F. Haney
L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2010) [hereinafter Haney L6pez, Post-Racial
Racism] ("The election of Barack Obama to the presidency has inspired many to marvel
at the seeming evaporation of race as a basis for social ordering in the United States, a
euphoria often expressed in proclamations that we now live in a 'post-racial' America.").
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for example, dominated public discourse as it became highly racialized. 2 And
a Republican congresswoman's recent statement about the GOP's search for
a "great white hope," not to mention the recent hurling of racial epithets at
Representatives John Lewis and Andre Carlson by people gathered at the
Capitol to protest health care reform, evoke anti-black sentiment from the
early 1900s.3
The term "post-racial" signifies that race has been eliminated as a
significant factor in the ordering and operation of U.S. society. The term
means that the United States has "moved beyond race" and indeed has
"transcended race." 4 The idea of a post-racial era is one in which the "nation
[has] unburdened itself of the albatross of race." 5 Stanford Professor Richard
Banks explains that "the election of Barack Obama does unsettle a
longstanding narrative in which racism looms as an implacable and
2 See Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 21, 2009, at A13.
3 Paul Kane, 'Tea Party' Protesters Accused of Spitting on Lawmaker, Using Slurs,
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2010, 10:25 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/20/AR2010032002556.html. Congresswoman Jenkins stated
that "Republicans are struggling right now to find the great white hope." John Hanna,
Jenkins: 'Great White Hope'Remark Not About Obama, NEWSVINE.COM (Aug. 27, 2009,
10:47 AM), http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2009/08/27/3198014-jenkins-great-white-
hope-remark-not-about-obama. The phrase "great white hope" is often associated with
pre-Civil Rights Era racism and is thought to have become a commonly used phrase in
the early twentieth century when white heavyweight boxer Jim Jefferies was lured out of
retirement to fight an African-American boxer, Jack Johnson. See, e.g., Barbara Holden-
Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive
Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 73 (1996) (discussing the origin of the phrase "Great
White Hope"); Katheryn Russell-Brown, Black Protectionism as a Civil Rights Strategy,
53 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 9 (2005) (discussing the origin of the term "great White hope").
Other incidents that contradict the idea that we are in a post racial era are: Congressman
Robert Bennett's prediction in 1999 that "George W. Bush's presidential nomination was
secure unless 'some black woman [came] forward with an illegitimate child"'; the 2006
U.S. Senate election campaign of Harold Ford, Jr., in which opponents "aired
commercials that drew attention to his interracial dating history"; and the reality that
"Alabama only removed the antimiscegenation provision from its state constitution in
2000, with 40 percent of voters wishing to maintain the moribund provision." Kevin
Noble Maillard, Miscegenation: An American Leviathan, 36-SUM HuM. RTS. 15 (2009)
("Even in the age of President Barack Obama, the son of an African Father and a white
woman from Kansas, American patterns of interracialism have remained relatively static.
Interracial marriages still account for fewer than 5 percent of all marriages.").
4 See Banks, supra note 1, at 41-42; see also Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The Grand Old
White Party Confronts Obama, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2008, at 13, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/opinion/17rich.html.
5 Phillip Morris, America Begins Its Journey into a Post-racial Era, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Nov. 6, 2008, at Al.
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unyielding impediment to African-American advancement."'6 Similarly,
sociologist Shelby Steele observes that "Obama's post-racial idealism told
whites the one thing they most wanted to hear: America had essentially
contained the evil of racism to the point at which it was no longer a serious
barrier to black advancement."'7 As Professor Cornel West notes, the term
"post-racial" declares that "' [riace doesn't exist. We're colorblind."'' 8
While the debate about a post-racial society rages, our justice system
continues to operate in a way that is race-conscious. While it seems as
though most of the discussion of race and the justice system concerns
criminal justice,9 juvenile justice, 10 education," and immigration, 12 race-
6 Banks, supra note 1, at 47.
7 Shelby Steele, Op-Ed., Obama 's Post-Racial Promise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008,
at 31.
8 Harold McNeil, West Discusses Obama's Victory, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 7, 2008, at
D10 (quoting Professor Cornel West).
9 See Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1424-29 (1988) (arguing that the lower rate of
imposition of the death penalty when victims are black violates the equal protection
rights of the black community); Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1023
(using "racial disparities in the American crime control system to assess race and racism
as key features of contemporary society"); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden:
Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 16 (2002) (discussing the
role of race in the application of the death penalty).
10 See Sara Sun Beale, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile
Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 532-44
(2009) (discussing the role of race in the increased punitiveness of the juvenile justice
system and the disparate impact of harsher policies on black youth); Barry C. Feld,
Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10
J.L. & FAM. STuD. 11, 13, 25-42 (2007) (attributing more stringent youth crime policies
to "the politics of race and crime" and examining the racial disparities in the punishment
of black youth).
11 See Tona M. Boyd, Symposium Response, Confronting Racial Disparity:
Legislative Responses to the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571,
573-74 (2009) (discussing "the racially disparate trend in [school] disciplinary practices"
and noting that it disproportionately feeds black students into the school-to-prison
pipeline); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 131, 131 (2007) (considering the effect of the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 on school
integration).
12 See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration
Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 295, 326 (2002) (stating that "[s]tereotypes about Arabs and Muslims have
influenced immigration law and its enforcement, as well as the civil rights of Arab and
Muslim noncitizens in the United States"); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 677 (2000) (contending
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consciousness also impacts family law. 13 Nonetheless, the family law canon
does not scrutinize race-based disparities in laws, procedures and outcomes,
and that omission feeds a mistaken notion of a race-blind or a post-racial
society. 14 One consequence of this omission is that it obscures race-based
decision making by legislatures, judges, legal reform organizations, legal
scholars, lawyers, and child welfare workers, and thereby immunizes race-
based decision making from scrutiny. In other words, since the family law
canon inaccurately describes family law as post-racial, or colorblind, the
canon immunizes racism and perpetuates racial inequality.
This Article suggests that the family law canon inaccurately describes a
race-neutral or post-racial state for family law, and that the canon should
correct its colorblindness so that legal authorities can address the problems
that structural racism creates for African-American families. 15 In other
words, when we teach and write about family law, we fail to adequately and
accurately discuss how law impacts African-American families, and thus
that "[r]ace-based [immigration] enforcement deserves special scrutiny because it
disproportionately burdens persons of Latin American ancestry in the United States").
13 See Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 31-40 (2008)
(examining the differences in how the law governs the interracial adoptions of Indian
children and the interracial adoptions of non-Indian children such as black children);
David D. Meyer, Lecture, Palmore Comes ofAge: The Place of Race in the Placement of
Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 183, 188 (2007) (discussing the role of race in
adoptions and child custody decisions). While any definition of family law is bound to be
inherently under- and over-inclusive, I find that Professor Hasday's definition continues
to capture the state of family law: "[F]amily law regulates the creation and dissolution of
legally recognized relationships, and/or determines the legal rights and responsibilities of
family members." Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825,
871 (2004) [hereinafter Hasday, The Canon of Family Law].
14 For a thorough and persuasive discussion of the history of colorblindness, see
generally Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities ": Race, Ethnicity, and
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) [hereinafter Haney L6pez, "A
Nation of Minorities '].
15 While the focus of this Article is on African-Americans, the family law canon is
similarly post-racial with respect to other races and ethnicities, as well. For example, why
do we not discuss in the typical family law course how immigration laws effectively
determine the rights and responsibilities of family members of some races and ethnicities
more than others? Similarly, why do we not discuss how laws privilege a particularly
ethnocentric conception of a nuclear family, and how that affects racial groups and ethnic
groups differently? Unfortunately, the protection that one's family receives directly
varies with one's race and ethnicity (not to mention socioeconomic status, citizenship
status, sex, or whether someone is able-bodied). While the popular narrative-the one
that is taught in most family law courses-is one that reflects colorblind equality for all,
and one in which family law no longer makes distinctions based on race, this narrative
has blinded us to the realities of racial family law hierarchies in society.
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family law has the appearance of being post-racial. 16 But, as I suggest
throughout this Article, this would change if we changed the family law
canon. The argument here proceeds as follows: Part I explores the family law
canon and some of the examples that legal authorities and scholars constantly
employ to minimize the distinctions that family law currently makes on the
basis of race. Part II disputes the colorblind canonical story by showing that
the law does not protect the autonomy of African-American families as much
as it does that of white families.' 7 This section also explains why it matters
that the family law canon has it wrong with respect to African-American
families: in short, colorblindness immunizes racism and perpetuates
inequality. Part III discusses why family law scholars-both those who
advocate color consciousness and those who advocate colorblindness-tend
to oversimplify the precedent that addresses the role of race in family law.
The Article concludes by emphasizing the importance of legal scholarship
that challenges the family law canon and invites family law scholars to
broaden and challenge the canon.
I. THE FAMILY LAW CANON
A. Defining Family Law
A canon is a way of thinking about a certain area of the law that is
generally accepted within the legal community and defines that area of the
law.18 What makes something canonical is, in part, its continued presence in
16 Some scholars, including Rachel Moran, Randall Kennedy and Robin Lenhardt,
have explored the relationship between family law and race. See, e.g., RANDALL L.
KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003);
RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTtMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE
(2001); R.A. Lenhardt, Forgotten Lessons on Race, Law, and Marriage: The Story of
Perez v. Sharp, in RACE LAW STORIES (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds.,
2008); Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences, 2007 Wis.
L. REv. 239 (2007). Thus, I refer to some of these works in my appendix, as suggestions
of works that should be included in family law courses to ensure that the family law
canon does not remain colorblind. See infra Appendix. The point is not that there are no
scholars who write about the significance of race to family law. The point is that this
scholarship is not part of the family law canon.
17 This Article does not take issue with legitimate and lawful interventions that are
designed to protect family members from violence, abuse, or neglect. The purpose of this
Article is to expose the fact that these interventions are, in some cases, based at least in
part on race, rather than legitimate and lawful factors, and that the family law canon
ignores these cases.
18 See J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARv. L. REV. 963, 984-85 (1998) (discussing the deep "canonicity of certain ways of
thinking, talking, and arguing" that are "an important part of what makes canons
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the foundational texts, stories, assumptions, problems, and narrative
frameworks in minds of successive generations. 19 This includes its presence,
therefore, in family law scholarship, casebooks, and jurisprudence. While it
is widely accepted that there are canons in some areas of the law, such as
constitutional law, contracts, and property law,20 the canon of family law has
only to date been explored directly and critically2' by Professor Jill Hasday
in The Canon of Family Law, which appeared in the Stanford Law Review in
2004.22 Nonetheless, the family law canon is tremendously important
constitutive of a particular culture or a particular discipline" such as law); Mark Tushnet,
The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187, 187
(2000) (describing a canon as "a set of themes that organize the way in which people
think about [a] discipline").
19 See LEGAL CANONS 3 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000); see also
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 825-26 (arguing that canons
include the notion of a "set of foundational texts that exemplify, guide, and constitute a
discipline," and also recognizing that it is generally accepted among legal authorities and
legal scholars that stories and examples can be included in a canon). Balkin suggests a
similar mode of transmission in his work on the transmission of cultural knowledge from
one generation to the next. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY 42-90 (1998).
20 See LEGAL CANONS, supra note 19, at 8, 47, 66.
21 While Professor Hasday's article is the first to explore the family law canon
directly and critically, we can also use family law casebooks to reflect on the canon.
Casebooks help compose the canon, but their authors' decisions are implicit-we can
only see the product of their deliberations (the casebook), rather than some account of
their decision making processes. Thus, this Article is an invitation of sorts to dialogue
with family law scholars in a way that may ultimately broaden and challenge the canon.
We can do so by making our implicit decisions explicit and then questioning, critiquing,
and reassessing the canon and how we transmit it to law students.
22 See generally Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13. Hasday notes
that the lack of scholarly work on the family law canon reflects the relatively low status
of family law in the legal academy, and, for that matter, in the legal profession. Id. at 828
n.4. Hasday rightly recognizes that this is puzzling, given, inter alia, the place of family
law in structuring people's lives, including the lives of their children. Id. It is indeed
puzzling, particularly because family law often involves complex interaction between
very complex areas of the law, i.e., constitutional law and tax law. See id. ("'[S]ome
students may bring a bias against [family law] because it does not enjoy the prestige of,
say, antitrust-although the total number of antitrust cases in one year makes up a good
day's work in an urban domestic relations court."' (quoting LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E.
TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW, at xxxv (2d ed. 2000))); id ("'While [family law] is a course
that students like to study, many consider it less difficult and less serious than courses in
commercial law, constitutional law, or taxation. Some consider family law a 'marginal'
course rather than part of the 'core' curriculum."' (quoting WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN
RELATIONSHIPS 1 (1994))); id. ("'Family law is ... 'undemeath' other areas of the law.
Its low status within the profession is well-known."' (quoting Martha Minow, "Forming
Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L.
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because it effectively determines the parameters of any family law debate.23
If the canon is inaccurate, it diverts attention from what is really at stake. By
defining the appropriate terms of a family law debate, the family law canon
either forces us to confront the legal (and practical) consequences of the
words that we use, or allows us to ignore these legal and practical
consequences. 24
If the stakes are so high, why have so few directly and critically explored
the family law canon? Canons are not often challenged, in part, because they
operate at the level of "common sense, powerful enough, that [their] tenets
are taken to require no reappraisal. '25 The virtual absence of discussion
about the canon of family law speaks volumes about its power.26
Professor Hasday argues that "the family law canon misdescribes both
the content of family law and its governing principles." 27 In particular,
Hasday challenges three of the most prominent themes of the family law
canon.28 First, she explores the relationship between family law and social
inequality and argues that the canon overstates the changes that have
occurred over time and understates the distinctions that family law currently
makes between families based on social class.29 This construction of the
family law canon, according to Hasday, has allowed legal authorities to argue
that family law does not perpetuate the oppressed status of historically
oppressed people. 30 Hasday then looks at the relationship between family law
and federalism, and disputes the canon's contention that family law has
always been a local matter.31 This particular aspect of the family law canon
has allowed legal scholars and other authorities to oppose certain attempts at
federal family law on the basis that federal family law is, by definition,
inappropriate and unprecedented. Lastly, Hasday explores the relationship
between family law and welfare law and refutes the canon's contention that
family law and welfare law are wholly separate categories. 32 Historically,
Hasday explains, this construction of the family law canon has allowed
REV. 819, 819 (1985))).
23 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 836.
24 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 178 (1996) (arguing that analogic
reasoning "is not reasoning but is at best preparatory to reasoning").
25 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 827.
26 Inertia may also be at work here. Casebooks are typically republished for many
years with only incremental "news" oriented amendments.
27 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 830.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 830, 833-71.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 831-32, 870-93.
32 Id. at 832, 892-98.
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authorities to avoid having to justify why family law applies very different
rules to the regulation of rights and responsibilities of poor families than it
does to other families. 33
This Article builds on Professor Hasday's work and explores another
theme that the family law canon misrepresents: the relationship between
family law and race. While the family law canon includes the right to
privacy, marriage, nonmarital families, adoption, domestic violence, divorce,
division of marital property, alimony, child support, and child custody, it
typically does not include a discussion of these topics in a way that
accurately describes the relationship between family law and race. In other
words, the way that we teach family law gives the appearance that family law
is post-racial-an appearance that should change to reflect reality.
Furthermore, and particularly important for the purposes of this Article, the
family law canon fails to include child welfare and welfare law, and the
relevance of these areas of the law for African-American families. 34 Child
welfare and welfare law are not generally taught within a standard family law
course, notwithstanding the fact that they are unambiguously family law in
that they regulate "the creation and dissolution of legally recognized
relationships, and/or [determine] the legal rights and responsibilities of
family members." 35
While Hasday identifies race and sexual orientation as areas in which the
canon of family law understates the distinction that it still makes between
families, 36 this Article builds on Hasday's work by exploring the canon of
family law in depth as it relates to African-Americans. 37 As a general matter,
this Article suggests that the family law canon has allowed legal authorities
to avoid explaining why family law may employ different policies to regulate
33 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 832, 892-98.
34 See infra Part II.
35 Id. at 871.
36 Id. at 854-61.
37 When I refer to blacks, African-Americans, or black-Americans, I am referring
both to a physical and sociocultural concept of race. Practically speaking, I am referring
to those whom others would identify as African-American and to those who would self-
identify as African-American. For a further discussion of the concept of race, see Shani
M. King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services
Organizations Need African American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1,
3 n.2 (2008) (discussing the evolution of race as a sociocultural concept). For this Article,
I have limited my explicit discussion to African-Americans and family law, but it is
important to note that the way that Latinos, Native Americans, and Asians interface with
family law is also affected by an individual's racial and ethnic background. For an
analysis of the extent to which society and law work together to maintain heterosexual
and monoracial couples as the normative center, see Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob
Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231, 234 (2009).
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families based on their race. In other words, the family law canon has lulled
the legal community into believing that race is no longer a factor in the
creation or dissolution of legally recognized relationships and no longer
determines the legal rights of family members. As this Article explains
below, a more accurate account of the relationship between family law and
race suggests that we are decidedly not a post-racial family law society.38
B. The Family Law Canon Is Colorblind
1. Loving and Palmore
Loving v. Virginia,39 statutes governing interracial adoption, and
Palmore v. Sidoti40 are the canonical examples that legal authorities and
scholars constantly employ to support the notion that family law no longer
draws racial distinctions. After the Civil War, statutes prohibiting interracial
marriage (commonly referred to as antimiscegenation 4l laws) became
widespread.42 Then, in 1967 the Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia
that antimiscegenation laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.43 Now, "legal scholars consistently identify Loving as
one of the most crucial decisions in family law, illuminating family law's
nature and core values."44 Eskridge asserts that "' [n]o respectable scholar
disputes the correctness of Loving,"' 45 and Randall Kennedy asserts that
"'any constitutional theory that cannot support [Loving's] result is a
constitutional theory that should not be supported."', 46
The hallowed place of Loving in the work of legal scholars and legal
authorities is significant because scholars use the example of interracial
38 See Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1023-24 (considering
mass imprisonment from a racial stratification theory and arguing for a renewed focus on
"post-racial" racism).
39 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
40 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
41 For a discussion on the origin of the term "miscegenation," see Jill Elaine Hasday,
Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1343 n.166 (1998).
42 See id. at 1345; Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 854; Emily
Field Van Tassel, "Only the Law Would Rule Between Us": Antimiscegenation, the
Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate over Rights After the Civil War, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 873, 903-04 (1995).
43 Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
44 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 854-55.
45 Id. at 855 (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 109 (1996)).
4 6 Id. (quoting RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 278 (2003)).
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marriage generally, and Loving specifically, to show that family law no
longer draws distinctions between families based on race.47 Some scholars
use Loving as an example of the way in which the state is prohibited from
"insist[ing] that race count as a factor in the ordering of people's most private
lives,"'48 and as furthering the idea that "all invidious governmental racial
classifications would be subjected to strict scrutiny and almost always struck
down."'49 Similarly, scholars observe that "[i]n the post Loving regime, at
least in terms of race ... no one has to worry about governments ...
thwarting desires to marry, ' 50 and that pursuant to Loving, "the boundaries of
47 Id. at 857 ("Scholars use the example of interracial marriage to stress how family
law no longer draws distinctions between families [based on race]."); see also Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 359, 362 & n.2 (D.C. 1995) (holding no denial of
equal protection in refusing to allow same-sex individuals to marry, citing Loving as
rejecting the idea that refusing to grant the ability to marry to same-sex couples "is 'akin
to' the discredited notion that 'a divine natural order forbids racial intermarriage,' a
notion which the Supreme Court quite properly laid to rest in Loving v. Virginia"); Cote-
Whiteacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 660 (Mass. 2006) (Ireland, J.,
dissenting) (citing Loving for the proposition that Loving v. Virginia "removed race as an
impediment [to marriage]"); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 977 (Wash. 2006)
(citing Loving for the proposition that "the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted
by invidious racial discrimination"). While clearly in the minority, there are a few
commentators who have suggested that Loving's holding contains some ambiguity about
the use of race in making distinctions in the family law context. See John Hart Ely, If at
First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group Harm in Brown v.
Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 215-16 (1998)
("The Loving opinion was devoted in its essential entirety to reciting the facts and
explaining why such laws hadn't been validated by history. Not a word was devoted to
establishing the proposition that such laws treated the races unequally."); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2087 (2005) (noting that the
Loving holding contains ambiguity).
48 Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1227 (1991).
49 Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 653 (2006); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lecture,
Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 853, 855-56 (2001) (citing Loving for the proposition that a state cannot "bar
different-race marriages" because doing so is an "invidious discrimination on the basis of
race, which is a highly suspect classification"); Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at the
Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits, and Facial Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935,
948 (2000) (citing Loving for the proposition that apparent facial neutrality does not
preclude close scrutiny and that states may not treat interracial marriages differently from
other marriages without a heavy justification).
50 Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing With Loving?: Race, Law, and
Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997); see also Joan Schaffner, The Federal
Marriage Amendment: To Protect the Sanctity of Marriage or Destroy Constitutional
Democracy? 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1487, 1509 (2005) (noting that Loving "held that
interracial couples have a constitutional right to marry"). In an interesting (albeit very
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race and place no longer have any bearing on the law of marriage between a
man of one race and a woman of another."51
The notion that race is no longer a permissible basis for the differential
treatment of families is also reflected in the work of legal scholars who write
on interracial adoption. Historically, many states prohibited interracial
adoption by statute, or effectively prohibited it in practice, 52 but this changed
after the civil rights and social justice movements of the 1960s and 1970s.53
Today, scholarly commentary regarding the use of race in the adoption
context generally focuses on how Loving and the Multiethnic Placement Act
(MEPA), as amended in 1996, prohibit the consideration of race in the
context of adoption. The MEPA prohibits any agency that receives federal
funds from denying to any individual the opportunity to become an adoptive
or foster parent based on the race, color, or national origin of the individual
or child involved, 54 and from denying or delaying the placement of a child
for adoption into foster care on the basis of the race, color, or national origin
of the child or the adoptive or foster parent.55 While prior to 1996, MEPA
provided that states could consider "the cultural, ethnic, or racial background
of the child and the capacity of the prospective foster or adoptive parents to
meet the needs of a child of this background as one of a number of factors
used to determine the best interests of the child," these provisions have since
small) window into the intransigence of the issue of race in marriage, a justice of the
peace in Louisiana refused to marry an interracial couple because he was concerned that
the children would suffer. See Don Ellzey, JP Refuses to Marry Couple, HAMMOND
DAILY STAR (Oct. 15, 2009, 11:02 AM),
http://www.hammondstar.com/articles/2009/10/15/top-stories/8847.txt.
51 Peter Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in Interracial
Marriage: Interstate Comity, Racial Identity, and Miscegenation Laws in North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, 1860's-1960's, 32 AKRON L. REV. 557, 557-58
(1999).
52 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 857.
53 See Bartholet, supra note 48, at 1176-78 (discussing the obstacles to interracial
adoption by law and custom and the subsequent increase in interracial adoptions in part
due to the "integrationist ideology" of the civil rights movement); Meyer, supra note 13,
at 188 (explaining that laws and social norms proscribed interracial adoptions until the
civil rights movement sparked interest in adoption across racial lines); Twila L. Perry,
Transracial Adoption and Gentrification: An Essay on Race, Power, Family and
Community, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 25, 28 (2006) (noting a substantial increase in
interracial adoptions in the 1960s and early 1970s and citing as a reason "a growing
social consciousness about race that emerged from the civil rights movement").
54 Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
382, 108 Stat. 4056 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994)), amended by Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-
04 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(l)(A) (2006)).
55 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(l)(B) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)(A)-(B) (2006)
(listing state plan requirements for federal funding).
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been repealed. 56 Thus, scholars stress that the "MEPA now not only prohibits
race matching, but also no longer expressly allows agencies to consider the
race, color or national origin of the adoptive parents or child as a factor in the
placement decision." 57 Similarly, scholars suggest that adoption placements
"must be colorblind,"58 and that "federal[ly] funded agencies are not allowed
to use race at all in making foster care and adoptive placement decisions." 59
Scholars also use Loving to support the argument that adoption must be
colorblind. Hasday observes that "[i]n explaining their opposition to
prohibitions on interracial adoption, scholars repeatedly observe that Loving
has virtually eliminated legal distinctions between families based on racial
composition, and that the remaining policies and practices disfavoring
interracial adoption are the last vestiges of an old issue." 60 Scholars argue
that Loving "deprived the state of authority over the perpetuation of racial
separation by means of its legitimating function over marriage," 61 and
suggest that Loving precludes denying adoptions or placement decisions on
the basis of race 62 and established a fundamental right to marry and to form a
family regardless of race.63
The notion of forming a family regardless of race was also addressed by
the Court in Palmore v. Sidoti,64 which held that race could not be used as
the sole factor in making child custody determinations. 65  Many
commentators have cited Palmore as an example of race not being a
permissible factor in child custody determinations because the state is
56 See Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5115a (1994), repealed by Act of Aug. 20, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808(d), 110
Stat. 1904; 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2006). MEPA, as amended, has no effect on the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-03, 1911-23 (2006), which provides that
Native American children shall be placed in adoptive homes that "reflect the unique
values of Indian culture." 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006).
57 Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1415, 1457 (2006).
58 Id.
59 Elizabeth Bartholet, Correspondence, Private Race Preferences in Family
Formation, 107 YALE L.J. 2351, 2354 n.19 (1998); see also KAREN SPAR, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., ADOPTION: INTERETHNIC PLACEMENT LEGISLATION IN THE 104TH
CONGRESS, at CRS-3 (1996).
60 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 858.
61 Jane Maslow Cohen, Race-Based Adoption in a Post-Loving Frame, 6 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 653, 665 (1997).
62 Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 39, 55 (1993).
63 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving: The Child's Fundamental
Right to Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L. REv. 297, 297 (2005).
64 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
6 5 Id. at 434.
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prohibited from "insist[ing] that race count as a factor in the ordering of
people's most private lives."'66 In essence, the family law canon would have
us believe that the law no longer treats African-American families differently
than it does white families. But the canon is wrong; family law dictates very
different consequences for African-American families than it does for others.
One of the most critical differences is that African-American families do not
benefit to the same extent as white families from the autonomous family unit,
which holds a hallowed place in the canon of family law.
2. The Canon 's Autonomous Family Unit
While family law was once governed by rules that gave black families
virtually no control over their family composition, the story now told by legal
scholars and legal authorities is that all families are "organic, autonomous
legal entit[ies]. '' 67 In other words, the story is that all families, including
black families, are able to organize themselves as they see fit without the
interference of the state.
Courts have certainly shaped the "autonomous family unit" story. In the
seminal case of Prince v. Massachusetts,68 the Supreme Court found that
there is a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." 69 It is
66 Bartholet, supra note 48, at 1227 (emphasis omitted); see also Chip Chiles, A
Hand to Rock the Cradle: Transracial Adoption, the Multiethnic Placement Act, and a
Proposal for the Arkansas General Assembly, 49 ARK. L. REV. 501, 515-16 (1996)
("Palmore v. Sidoti is widely acknowledged as the Court's most direct statement
regarding the use of race in child-placement decisions," noting that the Court found that
the use of race violated the Equal Protection clause); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity,
Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 61
(1994) (noting that Palmore enforced a "collective's constitutional imperative for racial
equality").
67 Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5
LAW& INEQ. 187, 189 (1987).
68 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
69 Id. at 166. While beyond the scope of this Article, it is interesting to note that the
right to family is also protected by a number of international conventions. Often, the right
to family and the right to privacy are intertwined, with the ultimate purpose of these
instruments being the protection of the family unit, or the protection of the family unit
from arbitrary interference. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides a good example: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his[/her] privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor attacks upon his[/her] honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, G.A. Res. 217 (1II) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(IH), at 73-74 (Dec. 10, 1948). Article 17 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights provides similar privacy-laden worded protection for the
family unit. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17(1)-(2), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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this notion of an inviolable family that has given rise to separate but
interrelated liberty interests that support the notion of an autonomous family
unit that is largely protected from state interference. The Court has, in theory,
protected the right to "establish a home and bring up children"70 and the
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life," 71 and
established a liberty interest in maintaining the integrity of a "recognized
family unit," such as a parent-child relationship. 72
Similarly, the Court has announced that the family unit has the
substantive right to maintain its integrity,73 explaining that it is necessary to
"protect[] the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," 74 and that "[ilt
is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural. '75 There does not appear to be a more
protected and cherished social institution than the family, as the Supreme
Court has told us that the family is our society's "most fundamental ...
institution." 76 The family's inviolable place in society "stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of
children." 77 Thus, the Court has repeatedly recognized that matters involving
family life are private and beyond the reach of undue state interference,
ostensibly regardless of a family's racial composition.78
Similarly, legal scholars describe the protected familial sphere as a
"fundamental right to form a legally sanctioned family bond and the liberty
to be free of undue state interference and discrimination in forging one's
70 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
71 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974); see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
72 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983). This notion began to surface much
earlier, even in the context of the slave family. For example, in 1801 a Virginia court held
that "an equal division of slaves, in number or value, is not always possible, and
sometimes improper, when it cannot be exactly done without separating infant children
from their mothers, which humanity forbids." Fitzhugh v. Foote, 7 Va. (3 Call) 13, 17
(1801).
73 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
74 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
75 Id. at 503-04.
76 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
77 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)
(alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)).
78 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 446 (1990); Moore, 431 U.S. at 502-03.
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most intimate relationships." 79 Legal scholars repeatedly emphasize the law's
default protection of "the integrity of the family, '80 that families have the
right to be "free of regulation by the state," 81 and that "no one seriously
questions the importance of maintaining the integrity of the nuclear family" 82
or the "sanctity of marriage and family." 83 Similarly, courts recognize that
"[i]n the United States, most rights and responsibilities for raising children
rest with the parents, in accordance with the strong value placed on the
sanctity of the family." 84
The notion that there is a stark line between the family and the state has
been particularly noteworthy in the context of dependency, in which family
law scholars have argued that the notion of "family autonomy" has resulted
in too little intervention in families. 85 In this context, scholars have argued
that "[f]amily autonomy ... is a pervasive feature of American family
law," 86 that "a stark line divides the family from the state," 87 that "family
autonomy serves to protect family integrity," 88 that "[albsent exigent
79 Woodhouse, supra note 63, at 300.
80 William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American
Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 347, 360 (2006) ("A judge ... applies the law
impartially in a variety of cases in which the law protects the poor, victims of
wrongdoing, the integrity of the family, and religious freedom, and the judge respects the
law when it does not empower him to prevent a third party from committing an immoral
act."); Vivek S. Sankaran, Out of State and Out of Luck: The Treatment of Non-Custodial
Parents Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 63, 70 (2006).
81 Paul M. Smith, What the Court Said in Lawrence, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
129, 129, 131 (2006), http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/the-yale-law-joumal-pocket-
part/constitutional-law/what-the-court-said-in-lawrence/.
82 Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1951 (2000).
83 Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing in Disguise: Protecting Minority Faiths Through State
Religious Freedom Non-Restoration Acts, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411, 450 (2000).
84 Gregory A. Horowitz, Note, Accommodation and Neutrality Under the
Establishment Clause: The Foster Care Challenge, 98 YALE L.J. 617, 619 (1989)
(footnote omitted).
85 ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 3, 38, 98-110 (1999) (arguing that there is
systemic underintervention by the child welfare system due to a general reluctance to
intrude on family autonomy); Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the
Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 569 (1992) (contending that "[a]ttempts to
accommodate family autonomy.., have significantly compromised the protection of our
children").
86 Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1485, 1498 (2007).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1499.
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circumstances, the state leaves parents alone to make their own decisions
regarding child rearing," 89 and that family autonomy "safeguards cultural
and moral diversity in matters of child rearing, which in turn serves
democratic principles." 90 In short, the canon of family law would have us
believe that the correct way "to interpret American cases dealing with family
autonomy issues is to say that courts will, whenever possible, defer to
parental authority and preserve the privacy that has come to be expected by
families." 91 Some scholars have indeed resisted the family law canon. For
example, Peggy Cooper Davis notes that "[t]he scope of constitutional rights
of family autonomy is largely undetermined" and laments that in the case of
black families in particular, "[i]n the area of termination of parental rights,
courts have not been protective of the family unit."'92 But the canon has not
yet been subjected to enough sustained and consistent challenge to alter the
notion of an autonomous family unit.
II. THE FAMILY LAW CANON DOES NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT THE
REGULATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES
The notion of an inviolable family and the increased protection for the
family sphere has some foundation indeed. But this story of an "autonomous
family unit" that is largely protected from the government does not
accurately reflect the regulation of black families. It obscures a reality within
family law that is not often discussed in legal scholarship, family law
casebooks, or jurisprudence: family law's failure to provide African-
Americans the same degree of autonomy to organize or structure their
families as it provides to whites. This reality is sadly ironic because of the
central place of the stories of former slaves in the passage of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 93 As Peggy Cooper Davis found, at that time
Congress was "deeply affected by the widely publicized accounts of parental
separations and fully responsive to the argument that rights of family are
89 Id. (footnote omitted). A leading family law casebook states that "the principle of
parental autonomy (the freedom to rear children as parents see fit) has long constrained
state intrusion into the family." D. KELLY WEISBERG & SusAN FRELICH APPLETON,
MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 795 (4th ed. 2010).
90 Huntington, supra note 86, at 1499 (footnote omitted).
91 McMullen, supra note 85, at 581.
92 Peggy C. Davis & Richard G. Dudley, Jr., The Black Family in Modern Slavery, 4
HARv. BLACKLETTER J. 9, 14 (1987).
93 DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 234
(2002); Davis & Dudley, supra note 92, at 14 ("The thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments were conceived by men who regarded the deprivation of family rights as a
fundamental vice of slavery and the protection of family rights as an essential component
of citizenship.").
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inalienable. '94 The stories of family separation and the right of family were
central to the Reconstruction Congress and, ironically, contemporary ideas of
family autonomy were born out of an effort to eradicate racial oppression.95
Yet, today African-Americans do not have the same ability to organize their
families as do whites. And a post-racial family law canon does not tell this
story.
The most poignant evidence that family law is not colorblind is the fact
that the autonomous family unit is less of a reality for African-Americans
than it is for whites. Indeed, for many African-Americans, the autonomous
family unit is largely a myth. The law's disproportionate intrusion into
African-American family life began with the slave codes and continues today
through the application of traditional family law rules, such as the best
interest standard, and through other systems-such as the social welfare and
child welfare systems-that are not traditionally included in the family law
canon, but nonetheless should be, as they affect family autonomy and
structure.96
A. The Myth of the "Autonomous Family Unit "for African-American
Families
The canonical story is that during the time of slavery black families were
highly regulated because white masters had the right to compose the slave
94 PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES 112 (1997); see CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (statement of
Sen. Harlan) ("Another incident [of slavery] is the abolition practically of the parental
relation, robbing the offspring of the care and attention of his parents, severing a relation
which is universally cited as the emblem of the relation sustained by the Creator to the
human family."); id. at 1324 (statement of Sen. Wilson) ("[W]hen [the Thirteenth
Amendment] to the Constitution shall be consummated ... [t]hen the sharp cry of the
agonizing hearts of severed families will cease to vex the weary ear of the nation ....
Then the sacred rights of human nature, the hallowed family relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, will be protected by the guardian spirit of that law which makes
sacred alike the proud homes and lowly cabins of freedom.").
95 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 234; see DAVIS, supra note 94, at 113 (explaining that
during debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, members of the Reconstruction Congress
were sensitive to violations of the integrity of slave families and "repeatedly
acknowledged the fundamental and inalienable character of rights of family"); Jennifer
M. Chac6n, Citizenship and Family: Revisiting Dred Scott, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 45,
62 (2008) (stating that for some members of the Reconstruction Congress, the Thirteenth
Amendment's eradication of slavery also necessarily included protection for "the basic
right of familial integrity").
96 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 892-98 (discussing the
exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon despite welfare law's regulation of
the rights and responsibilities of poor families).
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family; but that now, however, the disproportionate regulation of black
families is long behind us. According to this story, black families are now
able to organize their families on an equal basis with other families. This
story is reflected in virtually all of the leading family law textbooks, in which
the evolution of the right to privacy in the context of the familial unit is
routinely discussed in a race-neutral way, bereft of any historical grounding
in the context of slavery.97 In fact, there is virtually no discussion of slavery
at all in the leading family law casebooks, let alone in the context of a
discussion of the evolution of the right to privacy, or the "autonomous family
unit," for African-American families.
Despite our lofty platitudes about being a nation of blind justice and
equal opportunity, the American 98 legal system has singled out blacks for the
most "pernicious treatment" of any group for three centuries, possibly aside
from Native Americans.99 The legacy of slavery is one of the subtexts of this
97 While the major family law casebooks discuss the evolution of the right to
privacy in the context of the family, none explore explicitly how that evolution might
vary based on race. Similarly, while two major family law casebooks briefly mention the
lack of protection provided to African-Americans during the time of slavery, and one
includes an excerpt from Professor Peggy Davis, no authors make any connection
between a past lack of protections of slave families and a current lack of protections for
black families. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 180
(2d ed. 2009) (briefly mentioning in a note that slaves could not legally marry and lacked
protected family lives, without further discussing the current lack of protections for
African-American families); JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2006); LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E.
TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2010); HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS (6th ed. 2007); WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note
89, at 18 (citing and excerpting an article by Professor Peggy Davis for her proposition
that Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters are based on the antislavery
impulses of the Fourteenth Amendment and as such recognize and embrace the autonomy
of all families in contrast to the restrictions on the ability of African-American parents to
raise and impart values to their children during slavery); id. at 215-16 (providing an
excerpt of John Blassingame's study of slave life in which he discusses the regulation of
slave families, but making no connection to the contemporary failure to protect and
preserve African-American families).
98 The term American is used in this Article to refer to the United States of America.
It is used because this term has achieved almost universal acceptance as a reference to the
United States of America. The author pauses to acknowledge that its use is inaccurate
because it ignores the fact that there are many other countries in North and South
America.
99 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education and Missouri Jurisprudence:
Shelley v. Kraemer in a Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 673, 677 (1989)
[hereinafter Higginbotham, Race, Sex, Education]; see also DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 19-21 (6th ed. 2008); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 4-5 (1987); MARY FRANCES BERRY &
JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, LONG MEMORY: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 227-60
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Article and includes a color consciousness that is as intransigent as it is
complex. 00 To begin the discussion of the myth of the "autonomous family
(1982); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 4, 6 (1978) [hereinafter
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR]; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW 11 (3d rev. ed. 1974). See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN &
ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS
(6th ed. 1988). As a separate but related point that has relevance for this Article as a
whole, there can be no progress without knowing and understanding our history. Judge
Cardozo makes this point in his classic treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 54 (1921). In his seminal
article, Toward an Equalitarian Legal Order, Judge William H. Hastie, the first black
federal judge who later became Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, concluded that a historical perspective is necessary if one is to understand
progress in the area of American race relations. William H. Hastie, Toward an
Equalitarian Legal Order, 1930-1950, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 18, 30-
31 (1973). Judge Hastie analyzed the period of American history leading up to the civil
rights movement and "stressed that the 'struggle can be viewed in perspective only if the
antecedent status of the Negro is comprehended, and such realization is not easy today,
particularly for the many millions of Americans who have reached maturity since 1950."'
Higginbotham, Race, Sex, Education, supra, at 678 (quoting Hastie, supra, at 19).
100 Both the intransigent and complex natures of our color consciousness were
highlighted in the 2008 presidential contest. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Heading
Toward the Danger Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at A21 ("However one views the
behavior of Bill and Hillary Clinton-and however large the race issue looms in this
election, and it looms large-there can be no denying that an awful lot of Mr. Obama's
troubles have come from his side of the table."); Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan
Thernstrom, Op-Ed, Taking Race Out of the Race, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at M5 ('[1]t
may be time to rethink some of our most basic assumptions about voters and race."); Jay
Tolson, Does Obama s Winning Streak Prove That Race Doesn't Matter?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/campaign-
2008/2008/02/15/-does-obamas-winning-streak-prove-that-race-doesnt-
matter.html?msg=socialwebl ("The labels red and blue now define a partisan divide so
profound that it seems to have produced two entirely different nations. That divide is
itself sustained by a host of other divisions, including those of race .... "); Senator
Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2009) (transcript available at the
National Constitution Center), available at
http://www.constitutioncenter.org/amoreperfectunion/ ("Throughout the first year of this
campaign, against all predictions to the contrary, we saw how hungry the American
people were for this message of unity. Despite the temptation to view my candidacy
through a purely racial lens, we won commanding victories in states with some of the
whitest populations in the country. In South Carolina, where the Confederate Flag still
flies, we built a powerful coalition of African Americans and white Americans. This is
not to say that race has not been an issue in the campaign. At various stages in the
campaign, some commentators have deemed me either 'too black' or 'not black enough.'
We saw racial tensions bubble to the surface during the week before the South Carolina
primary. The press has scoured every exit poll for the latest evidence of racial
polarization, not just in terms of white and black, but black and brown as well.... [Still,]
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unit," and how this myth underscores an often ignored relationship between
family law and racial inequality, this Article first discusses the law regulating
the black family during the time of slavery.
It is necessary to start here because it is the neglect of slavery in family
law discussions that obscures the impact of its legacy on the country's
collective consciousness, and its impact on the consciousness of individual
Americans. We have much to learn from this legacy, which reflects an
"autonomous family unit" that is less autonomous for blacks than for whites;
like the pre-civil war caste system, reflects both practical and logistical
roadblocks to black family formation; asserts the incompetence and inherent
unfitness of black parents and, in particular, black mothers; and reflects
stories of family separation and the thwarting of attempts for black families
to remain together.
1. The Roots of Regulation: Black Families as Creatures of the State
From the inception of the slave trade in 1619, the law governing slaves
sought to strike a seemingly untenable balance. The law needed to
accommodate the notion that slaves were property, while at the same time
accommodate the principles of equality and human rights that were to be the
bedrock principles of this Nation.101 While England's common law system
provided some guidance in striking this balance, the American legal system,
which was still in its infancy, was left to develop its precedents and
governing principles largely on its own. 102
race is an issue that I believe this nation cannot afford to ignore right now.... The fact is
that the comments that have been made and the issues that have surfaced over the last few
weeks reflect the complexities of race in this country that we've never really worked
through-a part of our union that we have yet to perfect.").
101 See HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATER OF COLOR, supra note 99, at 58-60 (noting
the "exclusion of blacks from any basic concept of human rights under [colonial
Virginia] law" even as Virginia statesmen created the noteworthy Virginia Bill of Rights
that declared the equality, freedom, and intrinsic rights of all men); A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather than the Free": Free Blacks in
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 20-21 (1991)
(observing that Virginians "enacted repressive legislation to protect their property
interests in slaves" despite their leaders' worries about "the contradiction between their
support for the ideals of freedom and equality in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution and their opposition to those ideals for free blacks and slaves").
102 See HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 99, at 19-60
(discussing Virginia's pioneering role in developing slavery laws that would be emulated
by other colonies); THOMAS D. MORRIs, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860,
at 42-43 (1996) (citing the English common law of property as a source of the colonial
law of slavery); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First,
Humanity Second: The Recognition of the Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law,
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During the nineteenth century, the American legal system developed, and
the law specific to the regulation of the family was born. 103 For the first time,
the rights and obligations governing American family life were enshrined in
law. For white settlers, the "proper" roles of husband and wife were now
reflected in the law, and legal frameworks established rules for entering
marriage and divorce. 104 The law that eventually emerged defined "the
family" as "an organic, autonomous legal entity,"10 5 and this definition is
reflected in the writings of legal authorities and scholars to this day.
The newly emerging law governed only the lives of the families who
were not slaves. Slave families were not autonomous legal entities. 10 6 On the
contrary, the law governing slaves specified that slaves were subject, first, to
the will of their masters and second, to the will of all whites.107 Despite
blood relationships, love, or caregiving formations, slaves could lawfully be
sent to another plantation, another town, or another state. 10 8 Thus, the notion
of permanency for slave families was strikingly nonexistent, as slaves were
seen as individual items of property rather than husbands, wives, fathers, or
otherwise connected to other slaves as a family.'0 9 The most fundamental
and sacred life events-marriage, childbirth, and procreation-were
manipulated in the interests of profit for the slave owner.' 10 While slaves did
indeed form families, they did not have the blessing, or the protection, of
law."'1 And while black men and women did have long-term relationships
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 513 (1989) (noting that the common law of property "provided a
starting point for the law of slavery [in Virginia]").
103 For a thorough examination of the development of the American legal system in
the nineteenth century, see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW (2d ed. 1985), and for a thorough examination of the development of family law
during this time, see generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTUJRY AMERICA (1985).
104 Burnham, supra note 67, at 189.
105 Id.
106 Id.
10 7 JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 546 (2d ed. 2001); see also
GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 154 (1856).
108 Burnham, supra note 67, at 189.
109 PETERS, supra note 107, at 546 ("[Because they were not considered persons,
slaves had no legal rights."); Burnham, supra note 67, at 189.
110 PETERS, supra note 107, at 546; Burnham, supra note 67, at 189; see also
FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 99, at 127-28 (discussing how the institution of slavery
subjugated slave families). Jean Koh Peters explains that during this time, "all sexual
relations between slaves were left to be regulated by their owners." PETERS, supra note
107, at 546.
1iI Burnham, supra note 67, at 189.
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during this time, they were never considered husband and wife under the law;
consequently, their children were considered "illegitimate," having been born
to a couple that was not legally recognized as married. 112
The lack of protection for the slave family was reflected throughout the
law governing slaves. 113 For example, the law protected the ability of
masters to sell their slaves away from their families 114 and even permitted the
sale into slavery-irrespective of where their family may be-of any free
blacks who were found without proof that they were free. 1 5 Similarly, the
marriage relationship between slaves was completely subject to the whim of
the master, as "the right of the owner to separate the parties was a corollary
of his property right." 1 6 While selling married slaves away from one another
112 PETERS, supra note 107, at 546.
113 HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-
1925, at 9 (1976); PETERS, supra note 107, at 546. Jean Koh Peters observes, "Thus as a
bottom line, no slave relationships of any kind were ever acknowledged to be legal."
PETERS, supra note 107, at 546.
114 In Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, J. Clay Smith included a list
of abridged selections from the American Slave Code (which he gathered from the
abolitionist newspaper The Anti-Slavery Bugle) that illustrate masters' dominion over
their slaves. J. Clay Smith, Jr., Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1077, app. at 1105-12 (1994). For example, Smith found that the
Louisiana Civil Code provided that, "A Slave is one who is in the power of his master, to
whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry and his
labor." Id. app. at 1105. Similarly, he found that South Carolina Brevard's Digest
provided: "Slaves shall be deemed sold, taken, reputed, and adjudged in law to be
chattels personal in the hands of their owners, and possessors, and their executors
administrators, and assigns, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatever." Id. app.
at 1109.
115 For example, Smith found that the Mississippi Revised Code provided that,
"Every negro or mulatto found in the State, not able to show himself entitled to freedom,
may be sold as a slave," id. app. at 1108; the Georgia Prince Digest. Act Dec. 19, 1818
provided that, "Penalty for any free person of colour (except regularly articled seamen)
coming into the state, a fime of one hundred dollars, and on failure of payment to be sold
as a slave," id.; the North Carolina Act of 1799 provided that, "Any slave set free, except
for meritorious services, to be adjudged of by the county court, may be seized by any free
holder, committed to jail, and sold to the highest bidder," id. app. at 1110; the Virginia
Revised Code provided, "Any emancipated slave remaining in the state more than a year,
may be sold by the overseer of the poor, for the benefit of the literary fund!" id. app. at
1111; and the Slave Code of the District of Columbia provided that, "Coloured persons
residing in the city, who cannot prove their title to freedom, shall be imprisoned as
absconding slaves," id. app. at 1112.
116 HARRISON ANTHONY TREXLER, SLAVERY IN MISSOURI: 1804-1865, at 87 (1914),
in 32 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STuDIEs IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 183
(1914).
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was widely known to break the marriage bond,' 17 slaves were routinely
separated at their owners' will.1 8 Thus, as a practical matter, "the pre-Civil
War American caste system set up numerous practical and logistical
roadblocks to conventional family relations such that slaves could maintain a
defacto family life only with great difficulty."' "19
Slave narratives offer a particularly vivid window into the lack of control
that slaves had over their relationships. These narratives can be particularly
helpful in putting the lives of slaves in a fuller context, and they reveal
nuances of slave life that are often not found in case law, as there was no
legal remedy for most of the conditions about which slaves would otherwise
have sought legal redress. 120 The narratives reflect both fear of being
separated from family, as well as a sense of helplessness from being unable
to stop such separation.' 21 A former slave from Missouri, Malinda Discus,
recalled:
"I remember that my mother used to gather us children around her and pray
that we would not be separated. She was separated from her parents when
eleven years old and brought to Missouri from Tennessee. She never saw
any of her folks again and the last words her mother said to her was:
'Daughter, if I never see you again any more on earth, come to heaven and I
will see you there."' 122
Eventually, Malinda's husband was sold.' 23 After being sold, he was
asked to what extent he had been able to see his family. He responded: "Yes
Suh, sometimes I did. I seen my brothers and sisters but they had different
names. Then I heard my Pappy had died. I don't remember him. My Mammy
was sold down South and I never seen her again 'til after the war was
117 In Slavery in Missouri, a comprehensive treatise on the rights of slaves in
Missouri, Harrison Anthony Trexler highlights the anti-slavery movement's criticism of
the right of owners to separate married slaves. Id.
118 Id.
119 PETERS, supra note 107, at 546-47.
120 Higginbotham, Race, Sex, Education, supra note 99, at 688.
121 See id. at 688-89.
122 Id. (quoting Interview with Malinda Discus (Feb. 1, 1938), in THE AMERICAN
SLAVE: A CoMPosrrE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 168 (George P. Rawick et al. eds., 1977)
[hereinafter AMERICAN SLAVE]).
123 Id. at 689.
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over."' 124 The stories of family separation and the lack of any protection for
slave families are pervasive throughout slave narratives. 125
The status of family for blacks during slavery was summarized by one
family law scholar:
Thus this system of family law can be summarized in painfully simple
terms. The law not only did not recognize black families, but it also actively
worked to prevent the formation of black families until the Civil War. An
entire segment of American society lived in a system of family law that
actively thwarted their attempts to live together in conventional family
households. 126
Black families continued to suffer forced separation through the period that is
commonly referred to in American history as "Reconstruction" and its
backlash. 127 One of the central aims of Reconstruction was to foster the so-
called "new habits of social discipline in the freedmen."1 28 One of the
elements of this strategy was to enact "laws that permitted, or in some states
required, local officials to remove a child from the home of an African
American family when the child's parents did not have the means to support
the child." 129 While blacks were no longer subject to the absolute will of
their owners during this time, African-Americans often had little control over
the composition or structure of their own families, frequently being separated
from their children if they were poor. 130
124 Id. (quoting Interview with Mark Discus (Feb. 2, 1938), in AMERICAN SLAVE,
supra note 122, at 172).
125 Id. Another example is that of Charles Johnson of Vernon County, Missouri:
"'Yes Ma'am, I was a born slave. My Master's name was Caleb Goodlow. My Mistress,
Mrs. Goodlow she cared for me and raised me from a little fella.' 'Parents?' he replied. 'I
don't know nothin' bout no parents; can't remember ever seein' 'em."' Id. at 689 n.72
(quoting Interview with Charles Johnson (Sept. 8, 1937), in AMERICAN SLAVE, supra
note 122, at 200).
126 PETERS, supra note 107, at 548; see DAVIS, supra note 94, at 30, 90-91
(discussing the prohibition of legally binding marriages during slavery and the disruption
of bonds between slave partners and between slave parents and children); ALEXANDER
TSESIs, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 122
(2004) (noting that slaves experienced "great obstacles in maintaining stable family
relationships").
127 Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHL-KENT L. REV. 1541, 1549-50
(2001).
128 Id. at 1549.
129Id. at 1550.
130See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION:
1863-1877, at 201 (1988) (explaining that the poverty of former slaves was used as
justification for seizing black children and binding them out as unpaid laborers to former
slaveowners and other white employers); GUTMAN, supra note 113, at 402-12 (discussing
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While the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments caused
a number of blacks to have their marriages legally recognized,' 3 ' "black
codes" attempted to reestablish economic and social control over a black
population that, in the not-so-distant past, had been enslaved. 132 The black
codes were comprehensive legal schemes enacted to regulate the freedom of
blacks, and they often included provisions that were hostile to black family
formation, such as euphemistically titled "apprenticeship laws" that allowed
"judges to bind black orphans and poor children[,who were often black,] to
white employers."' 133 As they have throughout history, blacks fought to
maintain family relationships notwithstanding these laws; they were
sometimes able to take back their children, and were sometimes able to take
their cases to court. 134 Professor Dorothy Roberts has observed that once,
"[t]hree hundred Black citizens sent a petition to President Andrew Johnson
charging that '[their] homes [were] invaded and [their] little ones seized at
the family fireside, and forcibly bound to masters who [were] by law
expressly released from any obligation to educate them in secular or religious
knowledge. "",l35
Scholars have also observed the oppressive nature of these laws,
recognizing that they were just "a slight extension of anti-bellum [sic] laws
requiring all blacks over the age of twelve to have a white guardian."'136
While in some states the black codes never ultimately became law, southern
courts disproportionately enforced apprenticeship statutes. 137 The theory
behind apprenticeship statutes, at least in part, was that black parents were
incompetent because they had not acted as parents during slavery, as the
how black children were forcibly bound out as indentured servants to former slave
owners and other whites immediately after emancipation).
131 PETERS, supra note 107, at 548.
132 Id.; see DAVIS, supra note 94, at 114 (stating that the purpose of the black codes
was "to perpetuate white control over black labor as well as to maintain, through the Jim
Crow system, the civil and social subordination of black people"); KENNETH M. STAMPP,
THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 79 (1965) ("[T]he purpose of the Black
Codes was to keep the Negro, as long as possible, exactly what he was: a propertyless
rural laborer under strict controls, without political rights, and with inferior legal
rights.").
133 PETERS, supra note 107, at 548-49; see also FONER, supra note 130, at 198-201.
134 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 234; see FONER, supra note 130, at 201 (discussing
the forced apprenticeships of black children and their parents' efforts to win their
release); GUTMAN, supra note 113, at 404-12 (discussing the attempts by Maryland
blacks to have their children returned to them from compulsory apprenticeships).
135 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 234 (quoting GUTMAN, supra note 113, at 411).
136 PETERS, supra note 107, at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
FONER, supra note 130, at 201.
137 PETERS, supra note 107, at 549; see also FONER, supra note 130, at 198-201.
[Vol. 72:3
FAMILYLA W CANON
master could act in their place and subject their children to discipline. 138 This
theme is reflected in laws governing black families passed during the War on
Poverty, as will be discussed below, and continuing until the present day. 139
2. The Present-Day Regulation of Black Families
There are many ways to tell the story of the current regulation of black
families. This section begins by telling a story of disproportionate impact on
African-American families, showing the impact of the child welfare and
welfare systems on black families, in part, by virtue of their disproportionate
representation in these systems. Next a story is told of intentional
discrimination-both in the passage and implementation of the law-against
African-American families. In other words, the law intentionally
discriminates against African-American families to the extent that the poor
were reconceptualized as undeserving and black. 140 While some scholars,
such as Dorothy Roberts, have told these stories, what is particularly
important to consider for the purposes of this Article is that these stories are
largely absent from the family law canon.
138 See MARY FARMER-KAISER, FREEDWOMEN AND THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU:
RACE, GENDER, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 99-102 (2010)
(discussing how apprenticeship laws sanctioned the indenture of black children based on
the supposed inadequacies of black parents, and especially black mothers); MARY NIALL
MITCHELL, RAISING FREEDOM'S CHILD: BLACK CHILDREN AND VISIONS OF THE FUTURE
AFTER SLAVERY 155, 173 (2008) (describing the "postemancipation paternalism" that
justified the indenture of black children due to the perceived unfitness of black parents
and, in particular, black mothers).
139 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 235; see also Davis & Dudley, supra note 92, at 10-
15 (using case studies to explore contemporary manifestations of the reliance on
ostensibly pre-Fourteenth Amendment cultural, class, and racial blinders by child welfare
professionals and the implications for black family life). That the legacy of slavery is still
with us has been recognized by political theorist Judith Shklar, who has insightfully
recognized how its neglect in historical accounts has obscured the impact of its legacy on
this country's collective consciousness, and indeed, on the consciousness of individual
Americans. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 22-
23 (1991); see also IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN
UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 51-52
(2005).
140 See KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING
THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR 184-85 (2001) (citing research showing that
states with the most restrictive welfare eligibility requirements were the mostly likely to
have disproportionately black welfare populations); Lori Klein, Doing What's Right:
Providing Culturally Competent Reunification Services, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 20,
29 (1997) (concluding that "[f]amilies of color are treated differently than white families,
and to their disadvantage, at every step of the child dependency process").
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While this Article discusses disproportionate impact and discriminatory
intent separately for analytical simplicity (and because this is how our courts
have bifurcated our conversation about race' 41), it is important to consider,
when reading the first section below, that this is a story about race, as
opposed to a story about class per se.142 While the child welfare and welfare
systems disproportionately impact blacks because they are disproportionately
poor, these systems are not otherwise racially neutral. Or, put another way, in
this first section, the story is one in which these systems infringe on black
family formation because they are poor and because they are black. In this
first section, we can see class and race working together to contribute to a
less autonomous family unit for African-American families; the discussion is
about African-Americans "not only as an oppressed racial minority in a white
society but as poor people in an affluent one." 143 The next section of the
Article tells a story in which the laws infringe on black families because they
are black.
a. The Child Welfare System 's Disproportionate Impact on African-
American Families
Although child welfare laws are not traditionally thought of as "family
law," they "regulate[] the creation and dissolution of legally recognized
family relationships, and/or determine[] the legal rights and responsibilities
of family members."' 144 And the child welfare system is one component of
141 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977) (requiring both proof of discriminatory intent and racially disproportionate impact
for showing of equal protection violation by facially neutral state action); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976) (same); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1133-34 (1997) (discussing how the Supreme Court restricted disproportionate
impact claims by also requiring a showing of discriminatory intent); Kenji Yoshino, The
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (2011) (discussing how the Supreme
Court's enunciation of a discriminatory intent requirement has acted as an impediment to
disproportionate impact claims).
142 While there is a story to tell about class, as family law does provide different
rules to regulate poor families, this story has been told by others and I need not repeat it
here. See Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 832, 892-98 (discussing
how the exclusion of welfare law from family law has allowed the disparate treatment of
poor families).
143 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 38 (2010); see FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 269 (1977).
144 See Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 871, 893.
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family law that regularly intrudes upon African-American families. 145 This
system is so prevalent in African-American communities that community
activists and religious leaders have analogized it to the institution of slavery
and described welfare agencies as "'the new slave master."'' 146 Dorothy
Roberts has found that "[b]lack families are the most likely of any group to
be disrupted by child protection authorities,"'147 and statistics from around the
country support her conclusion. 148 While black children make up
145 In Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice For All, Sally K. Christie
discusses the disparate impact of the foster care system on African-American children
and families. Sally K. Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice For All, 36
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 12-15 (2002). She also examines the Adoption Assistance
and Welfare Act of 1980, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, and New York
City's efforts to reform its foster care system, and claims that "the devaluation of the
black family through excessive state intervention sends a message of inferiority that
harms black children and the group as a whole." Id. at 17-18. As an attorney who has
represented children in dependency proceedings, and as the son of a social worker who
has a life-long dedication to children, I understand the need for intervention in families
when children are at risk. But such intervention must take into consideration the
destruction that it can cause to viable family systems and the cultural, class, and racial
blinders that result in legislation and actions that were designed to and do
disproportionately impact African-American families.
146 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 69 (quoting Rev. Andy Williams, a member of
Chicago's black community). For examples of claims of racial discrimination that have
been taken to federal court, see id at 70.
147 Id. at 8. Probably the most striking illustration of this is the extent to which the
representation in the dependency system stands in stark contrast even to the
representation of other minorities. Roberts observes:
Black children even stand out from other minorities. Latino and Asian American
children are underrepresented in the national foster care population. Latino children
make up only 15 percent of children in foster care although Latino children now
outnumber Blacks in the general population. (Under U.S. Bureau of Census
standards, children of "Hispanic origin" may be of any race.) Take, for instance,
California, a state with a large Latino population. In 1995, 5 percent of all Black
children in California were in foster care, compared to less than 1 percent of Latino
children. Only 1 percent of children in foster care nationwide are from Asian/Pacific
Islander families.
Id. (footnote omitted).
148 The disproportionate attention that minority children receive at different stages
in the child protection process, such as referral, investigation, and service allocation, is
borne out by the Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-3).
ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., ADMIN. ON CHILD., YOUTH & FAMs., NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT, THIRD NAT'L INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 4-30
(1996), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/statistics/nis.cfm
[hereinafter NIS-3]; Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster Care or Reducing Child Poverty: The
Pew Commission Recommendations and the Transracial Adoption Debate, 66 MONT. L.
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approximately fifteen percent of the children in this country, they make up
thirty-one percent of the foster care population. 149 In larger cities, the racial
imbalance is even more apparent.' 50 "The proportion of Black children in
out-of-home care in large states such as California, Illinois, New York, and
Texas, ranges from three times to more than ten times as high as the
proportion of white children."' 151 For example, eighty percent of the foster
REv. 21, 45 (2005) (discussing how African-American children make up forty-one
percent of the foster care population but only fifteen percent of the total United States
child population). As noted in footnote 142, supra, I do not discuss the connection
between family law and social class in this Article. For a good article on the historical
and current connection between the child welfare system and social class, see Marsha
Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN L. REv. 423 (1983) [hereinafter
Garrison, Why Terminate].
149 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMs., THE
AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2008 ESTIMATES AS OF OCT. 2009 (16), at 2 (2009),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/afcars/tar/report 1 6.pdf
[hereinafter AFCARS REPORT]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 POPULATION ESTIMATES,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/2OOs/vintage_2008/ (last visited July 16, 2010).
150 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 8 ("The enormous growth in foster care caseloads in
the late 1980s was concentrated primarily in cities, where there are sizable Black
communities."); Ruth McRoy, Color of Child Welfare Policy: Racial Disparities in Child
Welfare Services 7 (Apr. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/mcroy-transcript.pdf (noting the
racial disproportionalities in the foster care populations in large urban areas). But just
because the racial imbalance becomes more apparent, due to the larger absolute number
of black children, the overrepresentation of blacks is not necessarily greater in large cities
than it is in cities in which blacks are a small minority. In fact, researchers have found
that the overrepresentation of blacks is greater in cities in which they are small
minorities. ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 9. Researchers have proposed a "visibility
hypothesis" to account for this phenomenon. Id. In short, when blacks "stick out more,"
or are "more visible," they are more likely to be overrepresented in the foster care
system, just by virtue of being more visible, and also because they may not have in place
the kinds of social networks that otherwise might be able to ward off an investigation. Id.
Thus, scholars have observed that when blacks make up more than fifteen percent of the
population, they tend to be placed in foster care at three times the rate of representation in
the general population, whereas when they constitute less than two percent of the
population, they tend to be placed in foster care at a rate of fifteen times their rate of
representation in the general population. Id. at 9-10.
151 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 8. In Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child
Welfare Policy, Dorothy Roberts explains that in states with large black populations like
Illinois and New York, and urban centers like Chicago and New York City, the racial
disparity is even greater than that reflected nationwide. Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty,
Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare Policy, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63, 71
(1999). For example, Roberts finds that in 1996, in Chicago almost ninety percent of the
children in foster care were black, and in New York only 750 of the 42,000 children in
foster care were white. Id.
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care children in Chicago are black. 152 While black children make up only
nineteen percent of the child population in Illinois, they represent more than
fifty-nine percent of the children in foster care. 153 Similarly, in 2009, there
were more than 16,000 children in the foster care system in New York City,
and only 647 of these children were white.154 And in San Francisco in 2007,
black children made up approximately sixty percent of the children in the
foster care system, whereas black children made up only eleven percent of
the population.1 55
Perhaps most striking is the extent to which the proportion of black
families in the dependency system overshadows other minorities. For
example, unlike black families, which are vastly and disturbingly
overrepresented in the dependency system, Latino and Asian-American
families are underrepresented in the dependency system. 156 In fact, Latino
152 Leila Noelliste, Local Family Bucks Foster Care's Grim Statistics, CHI.
DEFENDER, June 11, 2008, at 4, available at http://www.chicagodefender.com/article-
1062-local-family-bucks-foster-cares-grim-statistics.html.
153 NANCY ROLOCK, UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, CHILD & FAMILY
RESEARCH CTR., DISPROPORTIONALITY IN ILLINOIS CHILD WELFARE 5 (2008),
http://www.cfrc.illinois.edu/publications/outcomes-monitoring/disproportionality in illi
nois child_welfare.pdf.
154 N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., QUARTERLY REPORT OF
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN THE CUSTODY OF NYS LOCAL DEPTS OF SOCIAL SERVICES
(LDSS)--QUARTER ENDING 06/30/09, available at
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/reports/qrcare-2009-06.pdf. See generally ROBERTS,
supra note 93. Roberts observes:
About 30 percent of the children who live in New York City are white. Yet white
children make up only 3 percent of its foster care caseload. Less than 24 percent in
foster care are Latino and the vast majority-73 percent-are African American.
Clearly, child welfare authorities consider foster care a last resort when it comes to
white families.
Id. at 9. Poor black families are even more highly represented within the child welfare
system. Id. If you are a poor black child living in Central Harlem, for example, you have
a one in ten chance of being in foster care. Id. Another way to think about this is "that in
every apartment building in Central Harlem, we could expect to find at least one [black]
family whose children are in state custody." Id.
155 About DCYF (May 15, 2008), A Message from Director Margaret Brodkin, SAN
FRANCISCO DEP'T OF CHILD., YOUTH & THEIR FAMS.,
http://www.dcyf.org/content.aspx?id=2934 (last visited July 16, 2010); Data: Stats About
SF Families, SAN FRANCISCO DEP'T OF CHILD., YOUTH & THEIR FAMS.,
http://www.dcyf.org/Content.aspx?id=982 (last visited July 16, 2010); see also ROBERTS,
supra note 93, at 9.
156 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 8 (observing that "Latino and Asian American
children are underrepresented in the national foster care population"); see also ROBERT
B. HILL, CASEY-CSSP ALLIANCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY IN CHILD WELFARE, AN ANALYSIS
OF RACIAIJETHNIC DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY AT THE NATIONAL, STATE, AND
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children make up only twenty percent of the children in foster care despite
outnumbering black children in the general population. 157 In 2009, nearly
three percent of all black children in California were in foster care, compared
with less than one percent of Latino children. 158 And only one percent of
children in foster care nationwide are Asian-American.15 9 The Third National
Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-3) also found that blacks
receive disproportionate attention at all stages in the child protection process,
such as referral, investigation, and service allocation. 160
COUNTY LEVELS 9 (2007), available at
http://www.casey.org/Resources/Publications/pdf/AnalysisOfDisproportionality.pdf
(stating that, given their proportion in the U.S. child population, Latino and Asian-
American children have a lower likelihood of being placed in foster care); CTR. FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM & CHAPIN HALL, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY AND
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM 13, 44
(2009), available at http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pdfs/cjjrch final.pdf (stating that Latino
children are underrepresented in the foster care system).
157 AFCARS REPORT, supra note 149, at 2; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 149
(showing that the population of children under the age of eighteen is 73,941,848, and that
the population of Hispanic children under the age of eighteen is 16,092,537, or nearly
twenty-two percent of the nation's child population). Under U.S. Census Bureau
standards, children of "Hispanic origin" may be of any race. ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 8
(footnote omitted).
158 CAROLINE DANIELSON & HELEN LEE, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., FOSTER CARE
IN CALIFORNIA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 9, 10 tbl. 4 (2010), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_51 OCDR.pdf.
159 AFCARS REPORT, supra note 149, at 2.
160 NIS-3, supra note 148, at 4-30. Additional studies have confirmed this
conclusion. See, e.g., Leeann R. Mraovich & Josephine F. Wilson, Patterns of Child
Abuse and Neglect Associated with Chronological Age of Children Living in a
Midwestern County, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 899, 901 (1999); Sara H. Sinal et al., Is
Race or Ethnicity a Predictive Factor in Shaken Baby Syndrome? 24 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1241, 1244 (2000) (finding no statistically significant difference in shaken baby
syndrome based on race). While the Fourth National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and
Neglect (NIS-4) concludes that black children have higher rates of maltreatment than
white children, analysts question these conclusions because of faulty methodology,
relevant variables that the study does not consider, and issues of poverty that skew the
results. See, e.g., ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT (NIS-4): REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 9, 4-22 to 4-30 (2010) [hereinafter NIS-4];
ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. &
FAMS., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4):
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES OF RACE DIFFERENCES IN CHILD MALTREATMENT RATES IN
THE NIS-4, at 4 (2010) [hereinafter NIS-4 SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES OF RACE
DIFFERENCES].
With regard to methodology, the definition of "emotional neglect" is broad and
vague, and it keeps expanding. See Rich Daly, What's Behind Soaring Numbers of
'Emotional Neglect' Cases?, 45 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 8 (2010), available at
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http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/content/45/7/8.1.full; NAT'L COALITION FOR CHILD
PROTECTION REFORM, CHILD ABUSE IS WAY DOWN (DON'T TELL ANYONE): AN
ANALYSIS OF NIS-4 FROM THE NATIONAL COALITION FOR CHILD PROTECTION REFORM 3
(2010), available at http://www.nccpr.org/reports/NIS4.pdf [hereinafter NCCPR]. For
example, the definition of emotional neglect under the NIS-4 includes new forms of
maltreatment not included in the NIS-3 definition, such as "inadequate structure" and
"exposure to maladaptive behaviors and environments." NIS-4, supra, at 3-9; NIS-3,
supra note 148, at 2-12, 2-19. Similarly, under the NIS-4 maltreatment definition,
"overprotective treatment" and "inappropriately advanced expectations" are standalone
forms of maltreatment, whereas under the NIS-3 definition they are merely listed as
examples of maltreatment under the miscellaneous category of "other emotional
neglect/other inattention to developmental/emotional needs." NIS-4, supra, at 3-9; NIS-3,
supra note 148, at 2-19. The two new forms of maltreatment are another example of
vague classifications that are vulnerable to racial bias that can influence the sort of
judgment calls needed to interpret the classifications. Also, whereas the NIS-3
defines/explains each form of maltreatment constituting the "emotional neglect" category
(and other neglect categories), the NIS-4 does not unpack the meaning of any of the
forms of maltreatment making up emotional neglect, leaving more discretion to survey
workers who may not have the appropriate mental health training to recognize true
emotional neglect and are not asked whether the suspected neglect is necessarily a
consequence of parental behavior. NIS-4, supra, at 3-9; NIS-3, supra note 148, at 2-19;
Daly, supra. Given the expanding definition of emotional neglect, especially considering
that studies show that black children are more likely than white children to be reported
for suspected child abuse, these increasing findings should be questioned. Yuhwa Eva Lu
et al., Race, Ethnicity, and Case Outcomes in Child Protective Services, 26 CHILDREN &
YOUTH SERVS. REv. 447, 457 (2004) (finding black children are more likely than white
children to be reported for suspected child abuse).
The second reason to question the NIS-4's findings is that the NIS-4 coincides with
the economic recession that hit black families the hardest. See NCCPR, supra, at 7; NIS-
4 SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES ON RACE DIFFERENCES, supra, at 11. This is particularly
salient as there is a real danger of the conflations of circumstances related to poverty with
per se neglect, given the NIS-4 newly expanded definition of neglect, which includes for
the first time, "inadequate structure" and "exposure to maladaptive behaviors and
environments."
And, third, the maltreatment with which the NIS-4 deals is mostly neglect related to
poverty; the issue is not that black families have higher rates of abuse, neglect, and
maltreatment, but rather that the system deals with these poverty-related problems in an
especially punitive way.
There are a few additional things to note about the NIS-4. While the NIS-4 reported
that black children had higher rates of maltreatment than white children under both the
Harm Standard and Endangerment Standard, see NIS-4, supra, at 4-22, 4-27, the racial
difference actually reflects smaller decreases in reported maltreatment for black children
than the decrease in reported maltreatment of white children. Under the Harm Standard,
the rate of physical abuse declined 38% for white children while it declined 15% for
black children. Id. at 4-25. Under the Endangerment Standard, rates for physical abuse
declined 46% for white children and 15% for black children. Id. at 4-29. The incidence
rate for black children likely decreased less because black children are more likely than
white children to be reported as physically abused. See Wendy G. Lane et al., Racial
Differences in the Evaluation of Pediatric Fractures for Physical Abuse, 288 J. AM. MED.
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These wildly disproportionate numbers have led some scholars who have
extensively studied the child welfare system to conclude that "Black children
... are separated from their parents with relative ease."'161 What these
statistics also indicate is that African-American parents lack control over the
composition of their own families. A national study of the delivery of child
protective services includes a number of particularly sobering findings along
Ass'N 1603, 1603 (2002) (finding that physicians are more likely to report black children
with fractures to child protective services as suspected abuse victims even after
controlling for likelihood of abuse).
It is also important to note that despite reporting a finding of "strong and pervasive"
racial differences in the NIS-4, the authors state in the study's supplementary analyses
that "the NIS-4 detected no statistically reliable race-related changes since the NIS-3 in
rates of all maltreatment, all neglect, physical neglect or educational neglect, under both
definitional standards." NIS-4 SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES ON RACE DIFFERENCES, supra,
at 7; see NIS-4, supra, at 9.
161 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 9. Scholars also cite bias and stereotypes as
explanations for the disproportionality. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or
Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System: [An Essay],
48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 587 (1997) ("[T]he state clearly, and at times explicitly, targets
women based on their gender, race and class; and unless these women conform to
dominant gendered expectations, the state will not release their children."); Sally K.
Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice For All, 36 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 14-15 (2002) (noting that the foster care system does not value African-
American families and that "many agencies and the individuals that monitor these
[African-American] families see them as pathological, incompetent, and less worthy of
preservation"); Fitzgerald, supra note 66, at 62 (noting that abuse and neglect statutes are
often so vague that they permit "race, class, and cultural bias upon judicial
interpretation"); Beth A. Mandel, Comment and Casenote, The White Fist of the Child
Welfare System: Racism, Patriarchy, and the Presumptive Removal of Children from
Victims of Domestic Violence in Nicholson v. Williams, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1131, 1132
(2005) (discussing the Court's failure to address race in its decision in the foster care
reform case of Nicholson v. Williams and suggesting that this failure evidences the way in
which courts attempt to deny that racial biases and distinctions play any part in child
welfare determinations); Working Group Report, State Intervention in the Family: Child
Protective Proceedings and Termination of Parental Rights, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 485, 491 (2007) (noting the role of stereotypes in the disproportionate presence of
African-Americans in the child welfare system). It is also worth noting the difference in
approach in the divorce and foster care literature with respect to family integrity. While
in the divorce literature, a child's relationship with her noncustodial parent is generally
seen as a positive factor, and efforts are made to facilitate and encourage this relationship,
in the context of dependency, the relationship between a child and her biological parent is
generally seen as a threat to permanency; termination of parental rights is generally
encouraged if the child's return to her biological parent cannot be accomplished quickly.
See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the
Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 374 (1996) [hereinafter Garrison,
Parents' Rights]. This distinction is somewhat quizzical, as from the child's perspective
there may often be little difference between the two: in both cases the child has a parent
or parental figure to whom she is "likely to be deeply attached." Id. at 379.
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these lines, including the fact that even when African-American children
have exactly the same relevant problems as white children, they are more
likely to be separated from their families. 162 In relevant part, the report noted
the following:
African-American and Hispanic children are still more likely to be placed in
foster care than white children when their caretakers are employed; the
family is not on AFDC; neighborhood crime and drug problems are absent;
families live in small counties; households have fewer than three problems;
children have no disabilities, physical or mental health problems; and
caretakers do not have a substance abuse problem. 163
The report concluded that, "[c]ontrolling for each of these situations,
African-American children are still more likely to be placed in foster care
than white children." 164
Scholars have offered two reasons to explain why the child welfare
system disproportionately impacts African-American families: African-
Americans are disproportionately poor,165 and racism continues to permeate
162 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, NATIONAL STUDY
OF PROTECTIVE, PREVENTIVE AND REUNIFICATION SERVICES DELIVERED TO CHILDREN
AND THEIR FAMILIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1997), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/97natstudy/execsum.htm [hereinafter
NSPPRS]; see ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 17; Mark E. Courtney et al., Race and Child
Welfare Services: Past Research and Future Directions, 75 CHILD WELFARE 99, 125
(1996) (finding that black children and families "experience poorer outcomes and are
provided fewer services" than white children and families in the child welfare system);
Lu et al., supra note 160, at 457 (finding that black children are the most likely to be
removed from their homes and least likely to be reunited with their families).
163 NSPPRS, supra note 162.
164Id.; see Robert B. Hill, The Role of Race in Foster Care Placements, in RACE
MATTERS IN CHILD WELFARE: THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
CHILDREN IN THE SYSTEM 187, 197 (Dennette M. Derezotes et al. eds., 2005) (reanalyzing
the NSPPRS data and finding that black children still were more likely than white
children to be placed in foster care even after controlling for variables such as abuse
allegation, child disability, caregiver substance abuse problems, and Medicaid benefits);
Lu et al., supra note 160, at 454-56 (finding that black children were much more likely
than white children to be placed in foster care in San Diego even after controlling for
gender, age, and reason for referral); Barbara Needell et al., Black Children and Foster
Care Placement in California, 25 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 393, 393 (2003)
(finding that black children were more likely than white children to be placed in foster
care in California even after controlling for factors such as age, reason for maltreatment,
and neighborhood poverty).
165 For an analysis of the historical and current connection between the child welfare
system and social class, see Garrison, Why Terminate, supra note 148.
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the system. 166 It stands to reason that because the child welfare system was
historically designed to address the needs and the problems of poor
families, 167 and because black families are disproportionately represented
among the nation's poor,168 it would be reasonable to expect that African-
American families are similarly disproportionately represented in the child
welfare system. 169 It is not surprising, therefore, that the dominant
explanation of the disproportionate overrepresentation of black children in
the child welfare system is one rooted in poverty.' 70 This explanation that is
tethered in poverty also makes some sense given the child welfare system's
historical roots in the philosophy of "child saving" that involved saving
166 See Banks, supra note 1, at 42.
167 See Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United
States, 1820-1935, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3, 6-7, 10, 21 (Margaret K.
Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (tracing the development of the child welfare system to
English and colonial poor laws); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood:
Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform, " Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 688, 702 (1998) ("Britain's Elizabethan Poor Law, which separated the children
of the poor from their families, served as a model for early child welfare programs in this
country." (footnote omitted)).
168 Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 763,
765 (2001).
169 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 44; see CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2008, at 13 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-
236.pdf (showing that in 2008, the poverty rate for blacks was 24.7 percent while the
poverty rate for whites was 8.6 percent); Charlow, supra note 168, at 765 ("Given the
over-representation of minorities living in poverty, it is not surprising that a
disproportionate number of minorities are charged with child maltreatment."); Andrea J.
Sedlak & Dana Schultz, Race Differences in Risk of Maltreatment in the General Child
Population, in RACE MATTERS IN CHILD WELFARE: THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN THE SYSTEM, supra note 164, at 48 (noting that given
that "families of color are more likely to have low incomes, then one would expect
children of color to be at a higher risk of abuse and neglect").
170 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 26; see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED
TO HELP STATES REDUCE THE PROPORTION IN CARE 17-18 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07816.pdf (reporting that in a survey of U.S. states,
poverty was the most commonly cited factor to explain the overrepresentation of black
children in the child welfare system); see also Naomi Calm, Race, Poverty, History,
Adoption, and Child Abuse: Connections, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 461, 462 (2002)
(reviewing DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2002)) (arguing that "[c]lass, rather than race, still seems ... to be one of the dominant
motivations for exposing children to the child welfare system"); Charlow, supra note
168, at 775 (attributing the overrepresentation of black children in the child welfare
system to poverty),
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children from the ills of poverty, 171 including the so-called "orphan trains" in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 172
Nonetheless, while one might suspect that poverty is sufficient to explain
the disproportionate representation of African-Americans in the system, "the
overwhelming weight of the evidence indicates that racial bias is at work."'
1 73
Further evidence of this racial bias is that even when controlling for income
by considering black and Latino households that earn less than $15,000,
which is the income level that correlates most highly with maltreatment and
an income level at which blacks and Latinos are similarly represented, Latino
children are still considerably less likely to be involved in the child welfare
system. ' 74
Given the disproportionate representation of African-Americans in the
child welfare system, laws that govern this system disproportionately affect
African-Americans. One child welfare law that has restricted African-
Americans' choice over the structure and composition of their families is the
171 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 26; see also Judith Areen, Intervention Between
Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases,
63 GEO. L.J. 887, 899 (1975) ("For the poor, state intervention between parent and child
was not only permitted but encouraged in order to effectuate a number of public policies,
ranging from the provision of relief at minimum cost to the prevention of future crime.
For all others, the state would separate children from parents only in the most extreme
circumstances, and then only when private parties initiated court action."); Susan L.
Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT.
REV. 453, 453 (2002) (noting that "child saving" is the basis of the child welfare system);
Grossberg, supra note 167, at 22-27 (describing the development of the child saving
movement in the late nineteenth century).
1 7 2 See generally MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE OF-PHAN TRAINS: PLACING OUT IN
AMERICA (1992); I-IV ORPHAN TRAIN HERITAGE SOC'Y OF AM., ORPHAN TRAIN RIDERS:
ThiEIR OWN STORIES (Kay B. Hall & Mary Ellen Johnson eds., 1992, 1993); EILEEN
SIMPSON, ORPHANS: REAL AND IMAGINARY (1987).
173 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 48-49, 51-53 (documenting racial bias at every step
in the child protection system); see Ruth McRoy, The Color of Child Welfare, in THE
COLOR OF SOCIAL POLICY 37, 48-57 (King E. Davis & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley eds.,
2004) (discussing racial inequities in the child welfare system that have led to the
disproportionate representation of black children); Robert B. Hill, Institutional Racism in
Child Welfare, 7 RACE AND SOC'Y 17, 20 (2004) (highlighting how "structural
discrimination" in the historical development and contemporary operation of the child
welfare system has led to the overrepresentation of black children in the system).
174 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 48; see Ann F. Garland et al., Minority Populations
in the Child Welfare System: The Visibility Hypothesis Reexamined, 68 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 142, 146 (1998) (finding that although a near equal proportion of
blacks and Latinos live below the poverty level in San Diego County, black children are
much more likely to be involved in the child welfare system).
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Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA). 175 This law makes it easier to
terminate parental rights in the dependency system. Moreover, ASFA
weakens the requirement that child services agencies make "reasonable
efforts" to reunify families by providing exceptions to the requirement of
providing such efforts,176 speeding up the time frame for the termination of
parental rights, and providing states financial incentives to terminate parental
rights in the process of freeing children for adoption. 177 ASFA operates in
this manner notwithstanding the reality that children in foster care, who are
overwhelmingly African-American, often languish for years without ever
being adopted.' 78 Moreover, as the norm for child welfare service agencies is
175 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
176 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 108-09; Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable
Efforts: Demystifying The State's Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 293-94 (2003); Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection
Dilemma, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2099, 2116 (2003).
177 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 109-11. The rush to terminate parental rights in the
context of dependency proceedings is a trend that seems to conflict with a general
emphasis by children's advocates on protecting the relationship between parents and
children. Garrison suggests that the case of foster children is unique "because, in contrast
to the general emphasis on relationship protection that has characterized advocacy on
behalf of children, advocates have here argued in favor of faster and easier termination of
the parent-child relationship." Garrison, Parents' Rights, supra note 161, at 373; see
David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of
Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare
System, 54 U. PITr. L. REv. 139, 143 (1992) (arguing that the effect of delaying
permanency for children by attempting to reunite foster children with their natural parents
punishes children); George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K. ": A
Child's Right to Be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 384-85 (1993) (arguing that it would be in
the child's best interest to have a lower standard of proof when a termination proceeding
is brought by the child). On the other hand, some have argued that faster and easier
termination proceedings are not necessarily in a child's best interests. See, e.g., Garrison,
Why Terminate, supra note 148, at 447, 449-51 (surveying model acts that would ease
the process of the termination of parental rights).
178 Scholars have consistently found that once in foster care, black children are less
likely to be reunited with their families than are white or Latino children, and are also
less likely to be adopted. See Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the Odds of
Adoption Versus Remaining in Long-Term Out-of-Home Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 285,
288 (1997); S. Finch et al., Factors Associated with the Discharge of Children from
Foster Care, 22 Soc. WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS 10, 10-18 (1986), cited in Barth, supra,
at 286. Notwithstanding what might seem like an intuitive conclusion that once parental
rights are terminated a child will then be adopted, Marsha Garrison observes, "since
termination does not guarantee placement in a permanent home, looser termination
standards alone cannot ensure that children will escape the limbo status of foster care."
Garrison, Why Terminate, supra note 148, at 425. Garrison also observes that "[o]nce a
child enters foster care, he has about a 50% chance of remaining there for at least two
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to provide inadequate family preservation and reunification services, 179 so-
called "concurrent permanency planning," in which children are placed
simultaneously on an adoption track and a reunification track very early in
the proceedings, is likely to serve as a "'fast track' to adoption" of black
children.180 As two well-known family law scholars have found, "[t]here is
currently too much state disruption and supervision of poor minority
families. Any innovations in the family court system, then, should [instead]
be aimed at minimizing coercive intervention in families and at family
preservation."' 181
years; the longer he remains in care, the more likely he is to lose contact with his natural
parents and to change foster homes." Id. at 426 (citations omitted); see also AFCARS
REPORT, supra note 149, at 1 (the average length of stay for children in foster care in
2008 was approximately twenty-seven months); N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN &
FAMILY SERVS., supra note 154 (indicating that the median length of stay in foster care in
New York City was approximately two years in 2009); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND &
CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, CHILD WELFARE IN ILLINOIS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/state-data-
repository/cwf!20 1 0/child-welfare-financing-illinois-201 0.pdf (indicating that the
average length of foster care stay in Illinois in 2009 was approximately forty-nine
months); DANIELSON & LEE, supra note 158, at 9 (stating that the average length of foster
care stay for black children in California in 2007 was approximately two years).
179 See SHIRLEY BETTER, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM: A PRIMER ON THEORY AND
STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 103-04 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing how negative
financial incentives undermine the child welfare system's obligation to strengthen and
preserve families); McRoy, supra note 173, at 43 (explaining that the foster care
population has increased in part because family preservation services are supported by
limited funding while foster care and adoption assistance programs are more generously
supported).
180 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 111, 149.
181 Brooks & Roberts, supra note 171, at 455. In Social Justice and Family Court
Reform, Brooks and Roberts emphasize that they do not completely oppose government
intervention, but rather, that the goal should be to support families, and to intervene on a
voluntary, noncoercive basis. Id.; see also Donald N. Duquette, Looking Ahead: A
Personal Vision of the Future of Child Welfare Law, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 317, 333
(2007) (contending that "[t]he best way to improve the child protection legal system...
is to strengthen the general social support for families, [thereby] protecting more children
by voluntary, non-coercive means and diverting large numbers of children who today
would enter the child welfare system"); Deborah Paruch, The Orphaning of
Underprivileged Children: America's Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 119, 164 (2006) (arguing that "[i]ntervention should be authorized only to protect
children from very specific harms" and that federal and state funding should be
reallocated to preventative services supporting family preservation); Dorothy E. Roberts,
The Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 23, 36 (2005)
(suggesting that child welfare policymakers develop "community-building alternatives to
the current reliance on coercive interventions and foster care that are less costly both in
monetary and human terms, but that protect children as well"); Jane M. Spinak,
Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right Between Rhetoric and Reality, 31 WASH. U.
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The current state of the child welfare system leads to the inexorable
conclusion that the families of children who enter the child welfare system
are not typically strengthened, and, in contrast, the bonds of children with
their families are frequently broken. 182 While the canon's notion of the
autonomous family unit suggests that the family unit is practically inviolate
for all, the lack of relative control that African-Americans have over their
families is eerily reminiscent of the slave codes and Reconstruction, when
African-American families had little control over their own composition.
Yet the family law canon fails to reflect this reality. For example, family
law casebooks rarely cover the child welfare system, and if they do, they
relegate the topic to a few pages, often in the back of the book. Furthermore,
the relatively limited discussion that exists on the child welfare system fails
to adequately address racial disparities that permeate the system. 183 For
J.L. & POL'Y 11, 18 (2009) (arguing that coercive intervention should be "a last resort" in
the effort to assist the disproportionately poor and minority families in family court).
182 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 17; see BETTER, supra note 179, at 103-04 (arguing
that federal subsidies for the child welfare system provide a perverse financial incentive
to remove children from their homes instead of strengthening and preserving families);
McRoy, supra note 173, at 43 (stating that one reason for the growth of the foster care
population is that preventive services are supported by fixed funding, while
"[r]eimbursement to states for foster care payments and adoption-assistance programs are
open-ended and dependent on the number of children placed in out-of-home care and the
cost of their care").
183 See, e.g., ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 97, at 369-74; AREEN & REGAN, supra note
97, at 1189-1303; HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 97, at 991, 1003-04,
1008-12; KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 97, at 53-60, 488-524; WEISBERG & APPLETON,
supra note 89, at 809-918. Specialized texts for courses on children in the legal system
discuss racial disparities in the dependency system more so than traditional family law
textbooks. The segregation of these discussions in Child, Parent and State and Children
and the Law textbooks underscores the strength and intractability of the family law
canon. And even these specialized texts fail to convey the extent of racial bias in the child
welfare system. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND
THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 414-26 (3d ed. 2007) (mostly limiting
discussion of racial bias to a brief note about racial disparities in the context of reporting
on female substance abusers); SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 504-693, 694-741 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing child
welfare in chapters on child protection and foster care, respectively, but with no
discussion of race); LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND
THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE
COURTS 691-92, 698-702 (2d ed. 2006) (limiting discussion of racial bias in the child
welfare system to an excerpt of an article in which the author states that race exacerbates
the vulnerability of mothers in the child welfare system, and an excerpt of a Dorothy
Roberts article discussing the negative impact of the ASFA on black children and
families); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 264, 355-59 (6th ed. 2009)
(limiting discussion of racial bias in the child welfare system to a brief mention of
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example, in Family Law, by Harris, Carbone, and Teitelbaum, child welfare
is only briefly addressed in the back of the book, and the book notes only that
children of color are "disproportionately represented in the foster care system
and less likely to be adopted," without any examination of the reasons for the
overrepresentation. 184 Similarly, in Contemporary Family Law, by Abrams,
Cahn, Ross, and Meyer, there are only six pages in the entire casebook
devoted to child welfare, with no discussion of race at all.185 In Family Law:
Cases and Materials, by Areen and Regan, child welfare is relegated to the
second to last chapter of the book (so it is less likely to be covered), and there
is no discussion of the racial disparities that permeate the system save a
reference to "cultural bias" on one page. 186 And in Family Law: Cases,
Comments, and Questions, by Krause, Elrod, Garrison, and Oldham, the
discussion of race is limited to one problem that notes the racial disparities in
the reporting of prenatal drug and alcohol use in one Florida county.' 87
Instead of engaging in a thorough discussion of the impact of the child
welfare system's impact on African-American families, family law
casebooks focus on foster care in the context of adoption-such as the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and interracial adoption-and frame racial issues
around the pros and cons of interracial adoption. 188 For example, in
criticisms that child abuse procedures are racially discriminatory, and an excerpt of a
Dorothy Roberts' article discussing the adverse impact of the ASFA on black families).
184 HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 97, at 991, 1003-04, 1008-12
(briefly addressing child welfare in the back of the book in discussing foster care as a
source of adoptive homes for special-needs children).
185 See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 97, at 369-74.
186 AREEN & REGAN, supra note 97, at 1189, 1189-1303.
187 KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 97, at 509; see id. at 53-60, 488-524 (relegating main
discussion of child welfare to the last section of the chapter on the rights and obligations
of children, parents, and the state).
188 See, e.g., ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 97, at 1099-1103; AREEN & REGAN, supra
note 97, at 1359-76; HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 97, at 992-1011
(discussing the ICWA, a National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW)
position paper, and presenting scholars on both sides of the interracial adoption debate);
KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 97, at 361-64. Notably, even when an article discussing the
impact of the child welfare system on black families is excerpted in a section on
adoption, its curious location in this section (as opposed to the section on child welfare)
reflects a family law canon that obscures the connection between child welfare and race.
See, e.g., ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 97, at 1100 (discussing the opposing sides of the
interracial adoption debate by juxtaposing Ruth-Arlene W. Howe's article, classifying
interracial adoption as cultural genocide, with Randall Kennedy's article advocating
against race-matching); KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 97, at 363 (discussing criticisms of
interracial adoption with Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon's article discussing the applicability
of the ICWA to the African-American community and the disproportionate impact of the
foster care system on black children and families as "a form of cultural genocide"
(citation omitted)); WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 89, at 960-62 (discussing the role
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Contemporary Family Law, the discussion of race takes place in the context
of foster care and is limited to a discussion of the pros and cons of transracial
adoption. 189 In Family Law: Cases and Materials, the discussion of race in
the foster care system is discussed in the context of what should be included
in the standard for determining a child's best interest in the context of
adoption,190 and in Family Law: Cases, Comments and Questions, the
discussion of race in the foster care system takes place in the context of a
discussion of the support for and opposition to race-matching in adoption,
including a discussion of the ICWA and critical perspectives on interracial
adoption.191 In short, the family law casebooks are part of the family law
canon that fails to accurately and adequately describe the relationship
between family law and race. 19 2
b. Welfare Law 's Disproportionate Impact on African-American
Families
Welfare laws comprise another legal scheme that affects the ability of
people who live in poverty to control the composition of their own families.
But welfare law is not part of the family law canon. 193 Furthermore, since
African-American families disproportionately comprise the number of
impoverished families in the United States, welfare law disproportionately
impacts African-Americans. 194 Here, again, is an example of race and
that race should play in choosing an adoptive family with an excerpt from Dorothy
Roberts's book discussing interracial adoption and the impact of the child welfare system
on black families placed in the section on adoption).
189 See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 97, at 1099-1103 (including a discussion of the
ICWA, a NABSW position paper, and presenting scholars on both sides of the interracial
adoption debate).
190 See AREEN & REGAN, supra note 97, at 1359-76 (including a discussion of the
ICWA and Twila Perry's article on transracial adoption).
191 See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 97, at 361-64.
192 Although textbooks include some discussion of race and family law, see supra
notes 97, 183-84, 186-91, the coverage of race in the context of adoption hardly makes a
dent in the extensive relationship between race and family law that is not accurately or
adequately covered by the canon. This coverage does not change the inexorable
conclusion to be drawn from the currently constructed canon of family law-race has
been eliminated as a significant factor in the ordering and operation of U.S. society.
193 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 832, 893-98.
194 For example, recent statistics show that although blacks make up 12.9% of the
population, they make up 36% of the welfare population. USA QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010);
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES
PROGRAM (TANF): EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at x (2009), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
[Vol. 72:3
FAMILYLA W CANON
poverty working together. Blacks are disproportionately subject to laws that
govern the poor, 195 and these laws are designed and implemented (in part) to
regulate misguided and discriminatory notions of black families.
In his dissent in Bowen v. Gilliard, Justice Brennan recognized welfare
law's impact on African-American families. 196 In Bowen, the Court was
faced with a challenge to a federal statutory scheme that required that a
family's eligibility for welfare benefits take into account the income of all
parents and siblings living in the same home, including child support
payments. 197 As a result of this statutory scheme, a child who chose to live
with his mother would be forced to relinquish his father's child support
payment.198 In other words, this scheme, which the majority opinion upheld
as constitutional, involved a "direct and substantial" 199 intrusion into the
reports/annualreport8/TANF 8th Report 11 1908.pdf (reporting that African-Americans
constitute 36% of the families receiving welfare benefits). Although African-Americans
are overrepresented in absolute numbers, they make up a minority of the welfare
population. This fact is important to remember to avoid welfare debates falling victim to
racist assumptions. Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig explains that such debates can
become about race (when they truly are not): "Racist assumptions have turned public
opinion and policy against providing the American poor with welfare benefits as the
image of its primary beneficiaries changed from deserving, chaste white widows to lazy,
never-married black baby-makers." Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring:
Welfare Reform's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV.
1647, 1664 (2005); see also Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune,
New Lyrics?, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 389, 392 (2004) (noting that inner-city
African-American families have never exceeded 20% of the welfare population); Ruth
McRoy, Expedited Permanency: Implications for African-American Children and
Families, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 475, 478 (2005); Christina E. Norland Audigier,
Starving Five to Prevent the Birth of One? An International Human Rights Analysis of
Child Exclusion Provisions and the Failure of Federal and State Constitutional
Challenges, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 781, 816-17 (2004) (noting that the child exclusion
policies of current welfare policies have been argued to discriminate against African-
Americans); Sandra Patton-Imani, Redefining the Ethics of Adoption, Race, Gender, and
Class, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 813, 835 (2002) ("[L]argely ignored in the mainstream
discourse is the history of discrimination-both overt and covert-experienced by
African American families in the U.S. social welfare system.").
195 See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 194 (reporting that
African-Americans constitute 36% of the families that receive Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) benefits); see also BETrER, supra note 179, at 92, 94 ("[T]here
has been the conscious and unconscious manipulation of [public welfare] policies to
reinforce white skin privilege and white supremacy."); NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra
note 140, at 184-94 (giving examples of the implementation of racially discriminatory
welfare policies in a number of states).
196 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 613 n.5 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 589 (majority opinion).
198 Id. at 615 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 610.
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lives of many families on welfare. The dissenting justices recognized that
eliminating the ability of a father to provide child support could severely
affect that child's well-being and the father's connection with the child.
200
The dissent also recognized that this regulation would have a
disproportionate effect on African-American families, not only due to the
larger percentage of African-American families on welfare, but also because
a high percentage of African-American families are headed by one parent.
201
Legislative changes to welfare laws that significantly overhauled the
system, including the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, also
disproportionately impact African-American families. 20 2 Scholars recognized
200 Id. at 619.
201 See id. at 613 n.5. For scholarship discussing how various rules regarding child
support and reimbursement of state outlays interact to break families apart, see generally
Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of
Children To the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029 (2007).
Hatcher argues that the governmental policy of seeking reimbursement of welfare costs
through child support enforcement often results in increased turmoil between family
members when, for example, mothers are forced to repeatedly sue fathers to establish and
enforce child support orders, and when fathers are alienated from their children (due to
embarrassment or the desire to hide from enforcement efforts) when they cannot make
child support payments. Id. at 1081. Hatcher also suggests that mothers may also be
alienated from their children under this scheme when children see their mothers suing
their fathers in court. Id.; Daniel L. Hatcher & Hannah Lieberman, Breaking the Cycle of
Defeat for "Deadbroke'" Noncustodial Parents Through Advocacy on Child Support
Issues, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 5, 6 (May-June 2003) (discussing how the current child
support system can harm families and explaining how supporting noncustodial parents is
an antipoverty policy that benefits families).
202 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.). Many aspects of the legislation have a disproportionate impact on African-
Americans, a few of which I discuss below. One is the so-called Gramm Amendment,
which permanently denies cash assistance and food stamps to any person convicted of a
felony offense that "has as an element the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled
substance." Id. at § 115(a). Denying welfare benefits to persons convicted of drug crimes
has a disproportionate effect on African-Americans and Latinos. Recent Legislation:
Welfare Reform-Punishment of Drug Offenders-Congress Denies Cash Assistance and
Food Stamps to Drug Felons, 110 HARV. L. REv. 983, 985 (1997).
Not only are members of these groups already overrepresented among the ranks of
the poor, but the government officials responsible for enforcing drug laws focus
disproportionate attention on African-American and Hispanic Communities.
Although African-Americans make up only 12% of the U.S. population, they
constituted 55% of the 280,000 people convicted of felony drug crimes in state court
in 1992. Today, almost 90% of those individuals sentenced to state prison for drug
possession are African-American or Hispanic. The combination of racial bias in law
enforcement and poverty virtually guarantees that the weight of the Gramm
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that the new welfare scheme, by requiring individuals on welfare to work
without providing additional child care assistance, likely contributed to an
increase in African-American children in foster care.20 3
B. Family Law's Discriminatory Intent
In the earlier discussion of child welfare and social welfare laws, this
Article explored how laws that govern poor families disproportionately
impact African-Americans. This section further explores how that
disproportionate impact is not solely a function of statistics-it is also the
case that our policies toward the poor, especially as shaped during the Great
Society Era, were distorted to the extent that the poor were reconceptualized
as undeserving and black. This distortion was fueled by racist sentiment and
is at the core of policy decisions afflicting the (black) poor.204 As is
discussed below, these policy decisions were reflected both in the passage of
laws as well as in their implementation.20 5 Despite its impact on African-
Amendment will fall most heavily on African-Americans and Hispanics [and further
destabilize African-American and Latino families].
Id. (footnotes omitted).
203 Roberts argues that welfare reforms are directly responsible for the reduction in
impoverished mothers' ability to retain parental rights and have sharply increased the
breakup of African-American families by forcing black children into foster care, and to a
lesser extent, into the care of wealthier adoptive parents. ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 187-
92.
204 See Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1027-28 (placing racial
stratification in context in a way that does not minimize other forms of racism).
205 See NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 140, at vii (concluding that the ease with
which political elites abolished the primary safety net protecting poverty-stricken mothers
and children would have been impossible if politicians, policy analysts, and the mass
media had not "spent decades framing and morphing welfare into a ... 'black
problem'); Edelman, supra note 194, at 389 (discussing how welfare has been used as "a
high-profile, racialized political issue" culminating in the passage of the 1996 welfare
reform law); Risa E. Kaufman, Bridging the Federalism Gap: Procedural Due Process
and Race Discrimination in a Devolved Welfare System, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 1, 9 (2005) (finding "growing evidence that this increased discretion given to ground
level workers introduces a significant risk of racial bias and discrimination influencing
their individual determinations, particularly with regard to sanctioning and access to
support services"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 171, 177 (2003) ("The racial disparity in the child welfare system-even if related
directly to economic inequality-ultimately results from racial injustice."); Christina
White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and Safe
Families Act, 1 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 303, 320-21 (2006) ("The ASFA reveals ... that
Congress places no such value in maintaining the bonds between a black child and her
biological parents. Deeply rooted stereotypes about black family dysfunction place no
value on the relationship between poor, black parents and their children.... These racist
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American families, this story has failed to make its way into the family law
canon.
Much of the welfare and child welfare law that disproportionately
impacts African-American families originated in the 1960s and 1970s during
President Johnson's Great Society Era. At that time, the black Civil Rights
Movement was at its apex in the United States.206 Scholars have documented
virulent opposition to the War on Poverty because of its association with the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.20 7 In The Color of Welfare: How
Racism Undermined the War on Poverty, Jill Quadagno shows that as the
Civil Rights Movement shifted its focus from integration to economic justice,
"crucial linkages" developed between the War on Poverty and the Civil
Rights Movement such that "[p]rograms targeted to the poor, and especially
the black poor, were rapidly subsumed by the civil rights movement. ' 20 8 The
confluence of the Civil Rights Movement, the War on Poverty, and the use of
social programs to effectuate racial justice ultimately increased the backlash
against social welfare programs, as they were associated with a controversial
civil rights platform that was met with considerable hostility (particularly in
the South).209
stereotypes about black family dysfunction are indiscriminately applied and make it
difficult to imagine poor, black parents actually caring for their children. With legislation
like the ASFA, the child welfare system becomes a misnomer. It focuses on punishing
what white America has deemed 'disgraceful parenting' instead of deciding what is
actually best for the child.").
206 See ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 16.
2 0 7 Id. See generally JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RAcISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994).
208 QUADAGNO, supra note 207, at 28.
209 It is important to remember the historical context of the War on Poverty.
Quadagno explains:
The New Deal represented a breakthrough toward a more social democratic,
Keynesian welfare state. It also set in motion a great migration of blacks out of the
South. The migration undermined the political compromise that had allowed the
South to function as a separate nation and forced all Americans to confront the
impediments to racial equality that had previously been considered "the southern
problem." That confrontation occurred during the 1960s when the civil rights
movement demanded that Americans live up to their political ideology and
guarantee full democratic rights to all, regardless of race.
Id. at 188-89. In When Affirmative Action Was White, Ira Katznelson documents the
political compromises that were made in the design and the administration of the War on
Poverty, which ultimately reflected an accommodation of racial oppression.
KATZNELSON, supra note 139, at 25-52. This accommodation was made, Katznelson
explains, so that the way of life to which the South had been accustomed would not be
disrupted, or as Harry Byrd, leader of Virginia's democratic machine, suggested, it would
not disrupt the way that the South had dealt with the negro question. Id. at 4, 44. This
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At the same time, liberalism came to mean something new. Instead of a
universalistic conception that defined liberalism as a synecdoche for
"intervention for the common good," liberalism became associated with
governmental intervention to protect the civil rights of African-Americans. 210
Nearly every social program-welfare, job training, community action,
housing-became more than components of the welfare state that one
supported or reviled depending upon whether one favored government
intervention (a liberal) or opposed it (a conservative). Rather, because the
reconstruction of race relations became inextricably woven into the very
fabric of the Great Society, support for social programs came to mean
support for integration. It also meant that if one opposed government
intervention on behalf of civil rights, then one also opposed the social
programs that helped enforce them.2 11
Support for the War on Poverty was initially high, but it waned when it
became linked to civil rights.212 Sociologists have found that programs that
are targeted to the poor get considerably more public support than programs
targeted to African-Americans. 213 As Quadagno explains, because the War
legislation was shaped by what political scientist Robert Lieberman has called
"'discrimination by design' by means of 'race-laden' provisions with the capacity and
intent 'to divide the population along racial lines without saying so in so many words.'
Id. at 44 (quoting Robert Lieberman); see ALEXANDER, supra note 143, at 43 (noting that
although the New Deal programs benefited blacks disproportionately as they were
disproportionately poor, they were "rife with discrimination in their administration").
210 QUADAGNO, supra note 207, at 195.
211 Id. Quadagno explains further:
The reconstruction of liberalism had concrete political consequences, for the War on
Poverty activated the inherent conflict between positive and negative liberty. The
positive liberties it extended to African-Americans were viewed by the working
class as infringements on their negative liberties, the liberty for trade unions to
discriminate in the selection of apprentices and to control job training programs; the
liberty to exclude minorities from representation in local politics; the liberty to
maintain segregated neighborhoods. The resentment these infringements triggered
destroyed the New Deal coalition of northern wage workers and southern racial
conservatives, the stable Democratic party base for three decades.
Id. Additionally, "[r]educing government intervention became a rallying point only when
social programs threatened the negative liberties of white Americans." Id. at 194.
212 Id. at 196.
213 Id. at 172; see EDUARDO BONILLA-SILvA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-
BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 31-
32, 50 n.24 (2003) (discussing survey results showing substantial support among whites
for government services assisting the poor but significantly less support for government
programs benefitting blacks); Martin Gilens, Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare,
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on Poverty promoted racial equality, it "created a backlash against the
welfare state." 214 During this time conservatives talked the game of equality
but actively resisted its implementation in many areas; they routinely raised
the issue of welfare, characterizing it as a contest between hard-working, tax-
paying whites and undeserving, lazy, poor blacks who did not deserve the tax
dollars of the hard-working whites. 215 Ultimately, the social welfare policies
that developed during this time consciously regulated not only the poor, but
explicitly African-Americans:
No program better exemplifies the racially divisive character of the
American welfare state than Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC). Conservatives attack AFDC for discouraging work and family
formation and for rewarding laziness. Such comments are really subtly
veiled messages about family structures and employment patterns among
African Americans. However, often the attacks are neither veiled nor
subtle.216
Housing policies also changed when the War on Poverty became linked to
civil rights, and federal subsidies "plummeted after 1968, when white
homeowners, backed by the powerful real estate lobby, resisted residential
integration." 217
This history of social welfare laws shows that these laws
disproportionately affect African-American families because African-
Americans are disproportionately poor and because these laws were
explicitly designed to regulate African-Americans. And as the racial
composition of welfare changed, the image of the welfare mother changed
with it.218 During the Progressive Era, the image of the welfare mother was a
57 J. POL. 994, 995 (1995); Mark Peffley et al., Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political
Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 30, 31 (1997).
214 QUADAGNO, supra note 207, at 155.
215 ALEXANDER, supra note 143, at 47.
216 QUADAGNO, supra note 207, at 117. Quadagno explains that, "as the furor of the
civil rights movement wound down, there was a widespread backlash against spending on
social programs that benefited the poor, especially the black poor." Id. at 145-46.
217 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 16; see QUADAGNO, supra note 207, at 97-99, 101-
02, 108, 113-15 (discussing the opposition of whites to government efforts to integrate
housing as a part of the civil rights agenda, which resulted in a decrease in federally
subsidized housing).
218 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 174-77; see Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to
Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL.
L. REV. 415, 415 (1999) (noting that "as the complexion of the welfare population
became darker ... [a] less idealized image of motherhood ... emerged"); Lucy A.
Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare
Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1177-78 (1995) (stating that as states
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worthy white widow who was on welfare so that she could attend to her
maternal duties and take care of her children. 219 But the change in the racial
composition of welfare brought with it a new welfare dependency stigma,
work requirements, reduced benefits, and a new image of the welfare mother
as the "immoral Black 'welfare queen.' 220 As Michelle Alexander explains,
"Black 'welfare cheats' and their dangerous offspring emerged, for the first
time, in the political discourse and media imagery." 221 As the public's
perception of welfare became increasingly associated with black mothers, it
lost its popularity, became much less generous, and became a program that
was focused on modifying the behavior of African-American mothers.222
The 1960s also saw race-based changes to child welfare policies that
tracked the changes in the welfare system described above. As this country
rejected a social welfare solution to poverty as the clientele became
increasingly black, it similarly modified its child welfare system by reducing
services to African-American families and by becoming considerably more
punitive.223 In describing the passage of MEPA, Roberts explains:
became required to place black women on the welfare rolls during the 1960s, "the image
of welfare mothers changed from worthy white widow to lazy African-American
breeder").
219 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 174; see NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 140, at
44, 45 (discussing the limitation of public assistance mostly to white widows who met
high moral standards and kept a "suitable home" for their children); Brito, supra note
218, at 419-21 (discussing the Progressive Era women's campaign to win welfare aid for
deserving white widows and the near complete exclusion of black women).
220 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 177; see BETTER, supra note 179, at 95 (arguing that
the negative imagery of a black woman as a "welfare queen" served to justify cuts in
welfare benefits); Brito, supra note 218, at 415 (calling the "devasting image [of the
'Black Welfare Queen'] ... instrumental in smoothing the way for conservative
reformers to impose work requirements, strict time limits and other punitive reform
measures on welfare mothers").
221 ALEXANDER, supra note 143, at 45.
222 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 268; see NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 140, at
132-40 (discussing the shift in public opinion about welfare recipients and the
accompanying drop in value in welfare benefits and implementation of paternalistic
policies aimed at controlling black welfare recipients); Williams, supra note 218, at
1177-79 (noting that once black women became the image of the welfare mother, welfare
became less acceptable and federal legislators began to impose mandatory work
requirements on women receiving welfare benefits).
223 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 16; see LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF
POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES 20 (1989) (linking the rise in foster care population to the "extension of child
rescue activities to black children"); Mandel, supra note 161, at 1154-55 (finding a nexus
between the blaming of black mothers receiving welfare benefits and the harsh treatment
of poor black mothers in the child welfare system).
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The passage of the federal adoption law corresponded with the growing
disparagement of mothers receiving public assistance and welfare reform's
retraction of the federal safety net for poor children. In the public's mind,
these undeserving mothers-just like the unfit mothers in the child welfare
system-are Black....
... Maternalist thinking no longer justifies public aid because the
public views this aid as benefiting primarily Black mothers. The public
devalues Black mothers' work in particular because it sees these mothers as
inherently unfit and even affirmatively harmful to their children. There is
little reason, then, to support their caregiving work at home. To the
contrary, contemporary poverty discourse blames Black single mothers for
perpetuating poverty by transmitting a deviant lifestyle to their children. Far
from helping children, this view holds, payments to Black single mothers
merely encourage this transgenerational pathology. 224
Rather than societal failings, the situations of many African-Americans
were reconceptualized as individual failings, due in part to policy driven by
stereotypical notions of black people that have stubbornly persisted since
slavery, through Reconstruction, and have continued to the present. 225 The
stereotypes of poor black women-whether as incompetent or pathological-
are not new.2 26 Neither is the idea that stereotypes about black families being
dysfunctional influence policy. 227 Of particular relevance here are the
224 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 173-79; see NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 140,
at 34 (noting that under the image of the welfare mother, black women are "bad mothers"
who "behave badly themselves and transmit the wrong values to their offspring").
225 Thomas and Mary Edsall explain that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there
was a change from a belief that people's stations in life, specifically the poor, were due to
structural inequalities to a belief that where people found themselves was due to
individual failures and, thus, was not society's responsibility. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL
WITH MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXEs ON
AMERICAN POLITICS 12-13 (1992).
226 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 28; see GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF
MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE, 1917-1942, at 51 (1995) (noting that
in the early twentieth century, "[t]he racial specificity of the Anglo American maternal
ideal held Black women outside the boundaries of domesticity, as breeders, sluts, and the
caretakers of other women's homes and children"); NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note
140, at 45 (stating that "[g]endered racism [in the administration of welfare programs
during the early 1900s] ... invoked stereotypes of African-American women that
harkened back to slavery, including their supposed laziness, immorality, and sexual
promiscuity").
227 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 60-61 (exploring various stereotypes related to
dysfunctional black families, including black mothers as inherently and pathologically
unfit). In The Black Family in Modern Slavery, Peggy C. Davis and Richard G. Dudley
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stereotypical images of the black mother.228
The images of black mothers' carelessness linger from slavery, where the
so-called "Mammy" did not nurture or take care of her own children, but
instead selflessly nurtured those of her master.229 The "matriarchal" family
structure, or the proliferation of single, unwed motherhood being responsible
for the disintegration of the black family, was a myth that some argue was
supported by Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1965 report, The Negro Family: The
Case for National Action.230 In his report, Moynihan (then Assistant
Secretary of Labor and Director of the Office of Policy Planning and
Research under President Johnson) characterized black culture as a "tangle of
pathology," 231 which was pathological, in part, due to its matriarchal family
structure that purportedly "seriously retards the progress" of African-
Americans. 232 The welfare queen stereotype was also behind politics,
present a set of case histories that provide examples of how misguided understandings of
African-Americans can result in destructive interventions into "viable family systems."
Davis & Dudley, supra note 92, at 10. Such examples include whether it is the
mischaracterization of black culture as "bizarre" or "schizophrenic," unjustified labeling
of a black mother as "explosive" or "paranoid," or the lack of acceptance of kinship or
fictive kinship systems commonly used in the black community. Id. at 11. Davis observes
that "cultural and class blinders interfered with official judgments concerning the
appropriate response to concerns about the welfare of Black children." Id. at 14.
228 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 60-61; see MINK, supra note 226, at 51 ("Severe and
pervasive prejudice meant that single, African American mothers were assumed to be
morally unfit and uneducable-by definition 'unworthy[]' of receiving welfare benefits
during the early twentieth century); NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 140, at 44, 45
(noting that black mothers were seen as unworthy of public assistance in the early 1900s
due to the view that they were "incapable of being adequate caregivers").
229 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 61. Roberts further explains how this view was
reinforced after emancipation: "Whereas the virtuous white mother cared for the home
and depended on her husband's wages, economic conditions forced many Black mothers
to earn a living outside the home," and thus "[t]he ideal of motherhood ... never applied
to Black women and made them appear deviant and neglectful." Id. at 62; see also BELL
HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 84-85 (1981); DEBORAH GRAY
WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN?: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 46-61 (1985)
(discussing the mythology of the black Mammy and debunking the notion that she was
neglectful of her own family).
230 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING &
RESEARCH, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION ch. IV (1965),
available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/moynchapter4.htm.
231 Id.
232 Id.; ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 63 ("According to Moynihan, 'At the heart of the
deterioration of the fabric of the Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family. It
is the fundamental cause of the weakness of the Negro community."'). Haney Lrpez
notes that "Moynihan's deepest concern was the black family. It was the 'Negro family,'
Moynihan asserted, that 'is the fundamental source of the weakness of the Negro
community at the present time."' Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities ", supra note 14,
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campaign strategies, and policy decisions during this time. Ronald Reagan,
for example, rode the image of the welfare queen into office, which "became
a not-so-subtle code for 'lazy, greedy, black ghetto mother."' 233 In Chain
Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics, the
Edsalls explain that "one of Reagan's favorite and most-often-repeated
anecdotes was the story of a Chicago 'welfare queen' with '80 names, 30
addresses, 12 Social Security cards,' whose 'tax-free income alone is over
$150,000."'234 This stereotypical mythological character was also fashioned
by political scientist Charles Murray, who, in the 1980s argued that the
option of welfare caused black women to forgo marriage, while at the same
time, have more children to qualify for more welfare235-a claim that has
been thoroughly refuted. 236
at 1010; see also KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PoLrTIcs 33-34 (1997) (describing the report as supporting
the notion that instead of black family behaviors being a consequence of poverty, they are
a cause of poverty). While this Article takes issue with some of Moynihan's conclusions,
this Article does not mean to dismiss the report in its entirety as unfounded. To the
contrary, some of the report's conclusions should be taken seriously. For example, the
report rightly documents pervasive personal prejudice against African-Americans,
MOYNIHAN, supra note 230, at intro., and the inhumanity of slavery in the United States,
id. at ch. III. Nonetheless, overall, this Article takes issue with the report's largely
negative characterization of families from lower-socioeconomic classes, as well as
African-American families.
233 ALEXANDER, supra note 143, at 48; ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 64-67.
234 ALEXANDER, supra note 143, at 48 (quoting EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 225,
at 148).
235 CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at
154-66 (1984).
236 Dorothy E. Roberts, Irrationality and Sacrifice in the Welfare Reform
Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607, 2609 (1995) (noting that the claim that welfare
incentivizes welfare recipients to have children "is refuted by empirical research and
plain common sense"); see ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 65 ("It would be completely
irrational for a mother on welfare to assume the tremendous costs and burdens of caring
for an additional child given the meager increase in benefits that results. The vast
majority of women on welfare have only one or two children."); see also David T.
Ellwood & Lawrence H. Summers, Poverty in America: Is Welfare the Answer or the
Problem?, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 78, 93-94
(Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) (providing data showing that
welfare did not affect the structure of black families); Sara McLanahan, Charles Murray
and the Family, in UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY,
LOSING GROUND: A CRITIQUE 1, 2-3 (1985), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED263295.pdf (providing statistical evidence showing that
the unmarried birth rate among blacks actually "declined during the early seventies when
welfare benefits were increasing"); id. at 4-5 (arguing that "the general decline in
marriage, as well as the growth of female-headed families, is a response to broader social
changes that began well before the dramatic rise in welfare benefits during the sixties").
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Some argue that animus against black mothers drove the discriminatory
intent behind laws that govern families, such as the one challenged in Bowen
v. Gilliard.237 More specifically, "the popular image of the welfare queen
helped to drive the passage of child exclusion laws-or 'family caps'-in a
number of states, denying any increase in benefits to mothers who have
children while already receiving public aid."'238 As those who have watched
news reports with an eye for stereotypes and not-so-subtle racist images
know, the public hates the welfare queen because she steals taxpayer money,
is selfish, and cannot be trusted to spend the money on her children to whom
her deviant lifestyle would pass.239 These stereotypes have maintained, albeit
changing in form and sometimes name, over many decades. Stereotypes
about black families that confirm that they must be treated differently and
that justify state intervention as a means of protecting their children are
prolific. 240 And ultimately, these stereotypes drive social and child welfare
laws that are intended to regulate African-American families and intrude into
the family unit.241
237 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
238 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 65; see NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 140, at
159-60 (suggesting that racialized conceptions of black welfare recipients led to the
formation of family cap policies targeted at controlling their reproductive activities); Risa
E. Kaufman, The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare Queen ": Using State Constitutions to
Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 301, 308-12
(1997) (discussing how the stereotypical image of the "welfare queen" informs child
exclusion policies).
239 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 65; see PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST
THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 79 (2d
ed. 2000) (noting that the black welfare mother "is portrayed as being content to sit
around and collect welfare, shunning work and passing on her bad values to her
offspring"); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 97-101 (1999) (providing results of surveys showing
negative public attitudes toward black mothers receiving welfare benefits).
240 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 65 (explaining that stereotypes about "Black
maternal unfitness ... are reincarnated so persistently and disseminated so thoroughly
that they become part of the unconscious psyche"); see Appell, supra note 161, at 585
(stating that the disproportionately black families interacting with the child protection
system are viewed as "pathological, incompetent, and less worthy of preservation" by the
system's mostly white employees and agencies). See generally White, supra note 205
(arguing that the child welfare system through the ASFA devalues black families,
infringes on the autonomy of black parents to raise their children, and perpetuates the
racial oppression of the black community).
241 Malcolm X famously "spoke with bitterness about the role of the state in the
disintegration of his family." Davis & Dudley, supra note 92, at 9. Malcolm recounts:
"When the state Welfare people began coming to our house ... [t]hey acted
and looked at... [my mother] and at us, and around in our house, in a way that had
about it the feeling-at least for me-that we were not people.... My mother was,
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Incidentally, the response to critics who would say that this Article (and
this section in particular) has failed to provide sufficient evidence of racial
motivation is, in part, that direct proof of racial motivation is not necessary to
show discrimination. As this Article has discussed above, there is
considerable evidence that race combines with broader inequities to break up
black families disproportionately. But of course, today, it is hard to find
direct proof of racism in news reports, in statements by caseworkers, or in
judicial decisions. And, not only is it rare for racial motives to be articulated,
but they are often subconscious. 242 There is overwhelming evidence that
measurements of implicit attitudes of bias are often disassociated from
explicit racial prejudice.243 So, even those who do not believe they harbor
negative images and stereotypical notions of blacks-and do not want to
above everything else, a proud woman, and it took its toll on her that she was
accepting charity. And her feelings were communicated to us.... She would talk
back sharply to the state Welfare people, telling them that she was a grown woman,
able to raise her children, that it wasn't necessary for them to keep coming around so
much, meddling in our lives. And they didn't like that. But the monthly Welfare
check was their pass. They acted as if they owned us.... As much as my mother
would have liked to, she couldn't keep them out."
Id. (quoting MALCOLM X WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF MALCOLM X 12-13 (1965)). Tellingly, "Malcolm X described the subsequent order
making each of her eight children a ward of the state as 'Nothing but legal, modem
slavery-however kindly intentioned.' Davis & Dudley, supra note 92, at 10. Although
this perspective is obviously not one of an objective disinterested observer, it is
nonetheless important as "it serves to illustrate the other side of appropriate concern for
troubled and impoverished black families." Id. at 10.
242 See Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 144 (2004) (finding that both
unconscious and conscious motives can lead to discrimination); John F. Dovidio et al.,
On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 516-17, 534 (1997); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2005) ("[D]iscrimination is still
pervasive, now more often in the form of stereotyping or unconscious bias."); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995)
(suggesting that "subtle, often unconscious forms of bias[,] ... represent today's most
prevalent type of discrimination"); Charles R. Lawrence I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987)
("[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by
unconscious racial motivation."). For a review of relevant social science literature on this
point and its relevance to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) broadcast policy,
see Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2005).
243 Dovidio et al., supra note 242, at 531-36.
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harbor such images-may not be free from subconscious bias. 244 Just
because we are not aware of a bias does not mean that it does not exist.
It is also important to consider that the existence of racism does not
require that race be the only factor in a decision maker's mind and that it
very rarely is. Government officials may be primarily motivated by a desire
to protect children, but may also consider race in making an ultimate
decision. Harvard Law School Professor Randall Kennedy has debunked a
related argument in the context of racial profiling.245 Kennedy argues that
race only being a marginal factor "'cannot logically negate the existence of
racial discrimination,"' as "'[t]aking race into account at all means engaging
in racial discrimination.' ' 246 It may also be argued that the disparate initial
circumstances of blacks and whites negate the existence of any racism. The
problem is that there is considerable evidence that the playing field is not
level. This includes evidence of systemic and institutional discrimination in
many areas, including employment, housing, education, and social
services. 247
C. Best Interests Test
Another example that shows that family law is not colorblind-and thus,
that the relationship between family law and race should inform the family
law canon-is the application of the best interests test in family law cases.
Legal scholars suggest that race plays into determinations of custody in
implicit and hidden ways, such as through a best interests test that is so vague
244 Id.; Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From
a Demonstration Web Site, in 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE
101, 111-12 (2002).
245 See ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 93.
246 Id. (quoting Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13 & 20,
1999, at 30, 32-33).
247 See Peter Edelnan, Where Race Meets Class: The 21s Century Civil Rights
Agenda, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2005) (noting the "persistence of
structural racism-the racially disparate outcomes that occur in schooling, employment,
housing, the criminal justice system, and elsewhere, and that, among other things,
exacerbate the disproportionate poverty experienced by people of color"); Jamie Fellner,
Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 257,
261-65 (2009) (discussing the disproportionate role of race in drug law enforcement);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reparations for the Children of Slaves: Litigating the Issues, 33
U. MEM. L. REV. 245, 256-57 (2003) (noting discrimination in education and housing);
john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C.
L. REv. 791, 802 (2008) (discussing the residential segregation of African-Americans and
noting that "continued discrimination in the housing market, such as racial steering by
realtors and predatory mortgage lending, limits housing opportunities for people of
color").
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as to invite "race, class, and cultural bias upon judicial interpretation," 248
through court-ordered investigations by child protective services, and
through the inherently biased process for custody determinations in New
York's family court system.249
While the best interests test is facially race-neutral, and is generally
taught as if it is racially neutral, it is decidedly not post-racial. In his seminal
book, What's Wrong With Children's Rights, Martin Guggenheim strongly
criticized the best interests test as dangerously indeterminate, arguing that:
"[a] best interests inquiry is not a neutral investigation that leads to an
obvious result [and] is an intensely value-laden inquiry; '250 that "[o]nce the
best interests test became the standard [in child custody disputes], there were
no constraints on what the court was allowed to consider as relevant;" 251 and
that "[t]he best interests standard necessarily invites the judge to rely on his
or her own values and biases to decide the case in whatever way the judge
thinks best."'252 Of particular relevance to this Article, Guggenheim observed
that "[a] child's 'right' to limit parental authority only to those decisions that
further the child's best interests broadly authorizes state officials to oversee
and control families." 253
This "value-laden inquiry," as Guggenheim described it,254 invites racial
bias into judicial decision making. For example, in the seminal case of
Santosky v. Kramer2 55 in which the Supreme Court held that before a state
terminates parental rights, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the State establish its allegations by at least "clear
and convincing evidence," 256 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
248 Fitzgerald, supra note 66, at 62.
249 Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the
New York City Family Court-the Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 540-44 (2007).
2 5 0 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 38-39
(2005). For a seminal article on the indeterminacy of the best interest standard, see
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 260 (1975) (discussing the best
interests test as a value-laden inquiry). Dorothy Roberts has a similar criticism of the
child protection process: "In fact, the child protection process is designed in a way that
practically invites racial bias. Vague definitions of neglect, unbridled discretion, and lack
of training form a dangerous combination in the hands of caseworkers charged with
deciding the fate of families." ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 55.
251 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 250, at 39.
252 Id. at 40.
253 Id. at 247.
2 5 4 Id. at 39.
255 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
256 Id. at 769.
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recognized "the indeterminacy of the 'best interests' standard in the
termination of parental rights, and that race, class, and cultural bias regularly
taint child abuse and neglect adjudications, disproportionately subjecting
poor and minority families to hostile state scrutiny of their family lives. ' 257
Scholars echo the same general refrain as Professor Guggenheim and the
same specific refrain as the Supreme Court in Santosky. For example, one
scholar argues that "[t]he 'best interests of the child' standard invites the
same race, class, and cultural bias upon judicial interpretation as child abuse
and neglect statutes," 258 and scholars point out "that the best interests of the
child standard seem[s] to promote underlying biases regarding race, gender,
culture, and family." 259 In short, the best interests standard, like child welfare
and social welfare laws, is not colorblind and should inform the relationship
between race and family law and the family law canon.
D. Because It Is Inaccurately Colorblind, the Family Law Canon
Insulates Racism and Perpetuates Racial Inequality
It matters that the family law canon ignores the continued salience of
race for African-American families because the idea of colorblindness
immunizes racism and perpetuates racial inequality. In the context of family
law, race functions as a form of social stratification. This fact is evident from
the way in which race is instrumental to the misallocation of resources.
Historically, the primary function of racial stratification was to rationalize
exploitation. 260 Slavery is the quintessential example of this theory.261
257 Philip S. Welt, Adoption and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really
"Strangers Without Rights"?, 1995 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 165, 220 (1995); see Santosky,
455 U.S. at 763 ("Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor,
uneducated, or members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to
judgments based on cultural or class bias." (citations omitted)).
258 Fitzgerald, supra note 66, at 62.
259 Jena Martin, The Good, The Bad & The Ugly? A New Way of Looking at the
Intercountry Adoption Debate, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 173, 194 (2007). In
one article Marlee Kline engages in a very interesting discussion of how the best interest
test in Canada facilitated the taking of Aboriginal children from their homes. See
generally Marlee Kline, Child Welfare Law, "Best Interests of the Child" Ideology, and
First Nations, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 375 (1992).
260 Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1041; see WILLIAM J.
WILSON, POWER, RACISM, AND PRIVILEGE: RACE RELATIONS IN THEORETICAL AND
SOCIOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 24 (1973) [hereinafter WILSON, POWER, RACISM, AND
PRIVILEGE] (noting the use of racial stratification by a dominant group "to exploit the
labor of the minority group in order to increase or maximize rewards"); CARTER A.
WILSON, RACISM: FROM SLAVERY TO ADVANCED CAPITALISM 17, 20 (1996) [hereinafter
WILSON, RACISM] (arguing that an "exploitative and oppressive economic structure[]" is
the basis for racial oppression).
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Family law policies that destabilize and deconstruct African-American
families, if not acknowledged, will continue to contribute to social
stratification and deny African-Americans access to economic, political, and
social resources. Some scholars argue that on some level this is deliberate:
Professor Ian Haney L6pez explains, "[i]n the post-civil rights era, .. . racial
stratification seems principally concerned with protecting the wealth, power,
and prestige already secured. '' 262 What better way for those with the
resources to maintain their privileged position than to destabilize the primary
institution necessary for providing access to social, economic, and political
opportunity-the African-American family?
The creation of racial categories here is accomplished through
mechanisms that perpetuate structural racism---all of which are extant in the
family law arena, including on the societal, institutional, and individual
level.263 In a compelling and important discussion of "racial stratification,"
Ian Haney L6pez engages in a thorough discussion of the formation of racial
categories, much of which is relevant to my argument here. 264 Nonetheless,
without attributing greater salience to one of these elements over the other,
the mechanism that is the focus here is racial ideology and how racial
ideology in the context of family law contributes to the formation of racial
categories.
Various theories without any legitimate foundation, 265 including white
supremacist theories, have long justified the subjection of African-Americans
and other individuals of color, and colorblindness has now emerged as a new
261 Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1041; see WILSON, POWER,
RACISM, AND PRIVILEGE, supra note 260, at 24 (citing slavery as an example of
exploitation through racial stratification); WILSON, RACISM, supra note 260, at 17-19
(discussing the economically exploitative basis of slavery).
262 Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1041 ("To be sure, wealth
extraction continues today, and not just through inertia, but also in newly innovated
guises such as the increasing exploitation of undocumented workers.").
263 Id. at 1051-52. Trying to identify a precise reason for family law's
disproportionate effect on blacks, a single overriding cause, in other words, is a
misguided enterprise given how institutional racism works. ROBERTS, supra note 93, at
97. Black families are broken apart "because of the interplay of societal, structural, and
individual factors that feed into each other." Id. As Dorothy Roberts explains, "To
address the systemic discrimination against Black families, then, it is most helpful to
attribute the disparity to a web of racial injustice that includes all of these causes." Id.
264 Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1051-68.
2 6 5 See, e.g., HOWELL COBB, A SCRIPTURAL EXAMINATION OF THE INSTITUTION OF
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 25-75 (1856) (justifying slavery on the argument that
Africans were the cursed descendants of Ham, son of the biblical figure Noah); WILSON,
RACISM, supra note 260, at 74-75 (discussing pseudo-scientific theories about the
biological inferiority of blacks that were used to justify their oppression in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries).
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racial ideology that can take their place.266 It is no longer acceptable to
subjugate blacks based on explicit racial beliefs, but colorblindness is
becoming institutionalized, obscuring the contextual power relations in
society. 267 African-American families are broken up by family law rules that
bear no relation to racism, as colorblindness allows for rationalizations that
reflect racial inequality as being the natural order of things. As Haney L6pez
suggests "[tlhe seeming naturalness of racial inequality may support, and in
turn be supported by, the colorblind proscription on race-talk, but it seems to
be an independent, powerful aspect of racial commonsense." 268
Ignoring the role of race allows people to believe that the system is fair.
It obscures the reality that differential treatment is rooted in racial
privilege.269 By professing colorblindness, the family law canon ignores the
reality that family law continues to disproportionately regulate African-
American families and the reality that some family laws are designed to
regulate African-American families. As a result of its inaccurate
colorblindness, the canon immunizes racism because it sanctions the status
quo, which is racially stratified.
III. THE CANON'S PERSISTENCE: WHY WE FAIL TO CHALLENGE IT
Having concluded that the family law canon is inaccurate in its
colorblindness and that this inaccuracy hurts African-American families, this
266 Haney Lrpez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1063-64; see BONILLA-
SILVA, supra note 213, at 2-3 (describing colorblind racism as the "dominant racial
ideology" that perpetuates racial inequality today). See generally Amy E. Ansell, Casting
a Blind Eye: The Ironic Consequences of Color-Blindness in South Africa and the United
States, 32 CRITICAL Soc. 333 (2006) (describing the emergence of colorblindness as
racial ideology).
267 Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1061-62; see BONILLA-
SILVA, supra note 213, at 3 ("[C]olor-blind racism serves today as the ideological armor
for a covert and institutionalized system [of racial oppression] in the post-Civil Rights
era."); Ansell, supra note 266, at 333 (describing how colorblindness "serves in the post-
segregation context to stall transformation of the racial order in the direction of greater
equality").
268 Haney L4pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1064; see BONILLA-SILVA,
supra note 213, at 2 (arguing that due to colorblind racism, whites rationalize present-day
racial inequality "as the product of market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena, and
blacks' imputed cultural limitations"). See generally Ansell, supra note 266 (describing
the evolution and development of contemporary colorblindness narratives).
269 ROBERTS, supra note 93, at 98. Quadagno identifies the implication of our failure
to protect African-American families because of their race: "Yet the United States cannot
protect its families as long as racial segregation remains a blemish on the American
conscience and a contradiction of the American ethos." QUADAGNO, supra note 207, at
186.
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section explores some of the reasons why the canon's colorblindness is
unchallenged. Given the negative consequences for families, why do family
law scholars-both those who advocate color consciousness and those who
advocate colorblindness-tend to oversimplify the precedent that addresses
the role of race in family law? The answer to this question is complex, but
one reason is the family law canon itself. The canon of family law reflects
the colorblindness principle that many judges, lawyers, and scholars consider
the premise of Brown v. Board of Education270 and Shelley v. Kraemer,271
despite the more fundamentally sound view of the role of race in the law
which is clearly articulated in more recent cases, such as Loving v.
Virginia272 and Palmore v. Sidoti273 (but also, ironically, in a fundamentally
sound read of Brown itself). Nonetheless, it is what many consider the
premise of Brown and Shelley that has found its way into the family law
canon, and that makes it easy for conscientious scholars to oversimplify
precedent. In other words, the idea that family law is colorblind has solidified
itself in the minds of many judges, scholars, and practicing lawyers.
In both Shelley and Brown, on equal protection grounds, the Supreme
Court rejected state action promoting racial discrimination against blacks.274
In Shelley, the Court held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,275
and that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment "was the establishment of
equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the
preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on the part of the
States based on considerations of race or color."276
In Brown, the Court held that state-sponsored racial segregation in public
education violated the Equal Protection Clause.277 In doing so, the Court
observed:
"What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for
the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall
stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race,
for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
270 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
271 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
272 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In this section, I offer one possible reading of these cases. For
an important discussion of Loving as being the first decision to see colorblindness and
segregation as compatible, see generally Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of
Unintended Consequences, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 239 (2007).
273 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
274 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
275 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
276 Id. at 23.
277 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color?"
2 7 8
In Shelley and Brown, therefore, equal protection under the law meant
the prohibition of state-sponsored racial discrimination and segregation. But
over time, in the eyes of many judges, scholars and lawyers, the premise of
these cases has become one of colorblindness, and this premise is now taken
to require no reappraisal. 279 Haney L6pez laments:
The particular rationales for treating affirmative action and Jim Crow alike
increasingly matter less and less: it's now simply our constitutional law, an
Equal Protection bromide strenuously asserted but rarely defended-as
when Justice Thomas emphatically declares that "laws designed to
subjugate a race" and those that "foster some current notion of equality"
are, in each instance, "racial discrimination, plain and simple."280
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
the Supreme Court confirmed that it takes colorblindness as the premise of
these cases, interpreting Brown as requiring an adherence to
colorblindness. 281 According to the majority, a strict adherence to Brown
would require that even benign racial classifications should be struck down,
as the use of race in classification is always invidious. 282 In every case and in
every context, this would seem to be true. Or, in the now oft quoted words of
Chief Justice Roberts, "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 283
The legacy of Shelley and Brown, this Article suggests, is the ideal of
colorblindness as a social objective, where colorblindness means the
promotion of racial equality and the disapproval of any state action making
distinctions based on race. But the idea that we are no longer permitted to
make distinctions about people based on their race ignores the persistence of
race as a basis for social stratification. Nonetheless, this Article's main
objective is not to argue that as a normative matter the law should (or should
278 Id. at 490 n.5 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880)).
279 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 752 (2007) (consolidating two cases brought by parents challenging the integration
programs in school districts in Jefferson County, Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington);
Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities ", supra note 14, at 1063.
280 Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities ", supra note 14, at 1063.
281 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747-48.
282 See id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring); Jess Bravin & Daniel Golden, Court
Limits How Districts Integrate Schools: Race-Based Policy Ban Augurs Broad Changes;
Clash Over Brown Case, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2007, at Al.
283 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
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not) be used to overcome past racial harms and to create a non-racially
stratified and non-socially stratified society. What is important to emphasize
for the purposes of this Article is that it is what many consider the premise of
Shelley and Brown that has found its way into the family law canon, and that
makes it easy for conscientious scholars to oversimplify precedent. In other
words, the idea that the family law canon is colorblind has solidified itself in
the minds of many judges, scholars, and practicing lawyers. Instead, the
family law canon should adopt a more nuanced and fundamentally sound
view of these cases, perhaps like the Court's reading of the Constitution in
Loving and Palmore.
In both Loving and Palmore, the Court was concerned about invidious
racial classifications. 284 As in Shelley and Brown, the use of race in Loving
and Palmore was pernicious and had the purpose of entrenching the
subordination of blacks and giving legal effect to racial prejudice, but the
Court's view in these latter cases is one that a careful reading shows is more
nuanced than one based solely in colorblindness. In Loving, the Court
expressed the need to eliminate state-sponsored "invidious racial
discrimination," 285 asserted that such racial classifications were "designed to
maintain White Supremacy," 286 and stated that the Equal Protection Clause
required "that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious
racial discriminations." 287 And in Palmore, the Court noted that racial
classifications tended to "reflect racial prejudice, ' 288 and maintained that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited the law from giving effect to private
racial biases. 289
The family law canon, in response, promoted colorblindness. 290 If the
above quoted excerpts were all that there was to these cases, this view might
be right. But in Loving and Palmore, the Court's holding was more nuanced
than a reading steeped in the common perception of Brown and Shelley might
reveal. In Loving, the Court took issue with the fact that the State of
Virginia's antimiscegenation statute was based solely on race.2 91 Also, in
284 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-
12(1967).
285 Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
286 Id. at 11.
287 Id. at 12.
288 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.
289 Id. at 433-34.
290 See Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 857 (discussing how
family law scholars use Loving as a canonical example to argue that "family law no
longer draws [racial] distinctions between families.... [and] no longer bans 'color-blind
romance' (footnote omitted)).
291 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
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Palmore, the Court rejected the state court's ruling because race was the only
factor in the court's custody decision. 292 Thus, Loving and Palmore suggest
that the Court was of the view that race can be a factor, although not the sole
factor and never an invidious one, in state action determining how to
structure families. These cases suggest that the canon of family law is not
actually colorblind or post-racial.
The same applies to Brown, of course, notwithstanding the fact that this
decision is commonly read in a colorblind way. In Brown, the Court in no
way embraced an anticlassification conception of the Constitution. At the
time that Brown was decided, only black children were struggling to attend
white schools293 and consequently, the promise of Brown was racial
integration, which was to be accomplished by racially conscious solutions to
integrate public schools that were resisting integration and were
discriminating against African-Americans. 294 A more nuanced reading of
Brown suggests that race-consciousness in certain circumstances is consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his
dissent in Parents Involved, Justice Breyer explained: "[S]ince this Court's
decision in Brown, the law has consistently and unequivocally approved of
both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures," 295 and recognized
that the race-consciousness had "been accepted by every branch of
government and is rooted in the history of the Equal Protection Clause
292 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.
293 See, e.g., J. HARvtE WILKINsON II, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 11 (1979) ("Everyone understands that
Brown v. Board of Education helped deliver the Negro from over three centuries of legal
bondage."); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421, 425 (1960) ("History, too, tells us that segregation was imposed on one race by
the other race; consent was not invited or required. Segregation in the South grew up and
is kept going because and only because the white race has wanted it that way-an
incontrovertible fact which in itself hardly consorts with equality.").
294 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483-95 (1954); see also Parents Involved
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that the Constitution permits race-conscious desegregation plans
that are narrowly tailored); id. at 862-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Equal Protection
Clause outlaws invidious discrimination, but does not similarly forbid all use of race-
conscious criteria."); id. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[S]ince this Court's decision in
Brown, the law has consistently and unequivocally approved of both voluntary and
compulsory race-conscious measures .... "). This reading of Brown was supported by
dozens of subsequent cases in which school districts were told to engage in race-
conscious practices. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455 n.3
(1979); Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1971); Green v. Cnty Sch.
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
295 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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itself."'296 Notwithstanding what this nuanced reading of Loving, Palmore,
and Brown suggests about the place of colorblindness in family law, the
notion of colorblindness exists.
As a normative matter, modem courts have insisted that race should not
count in a discriminatory way against African-Americans. Not unrelated, but
quite separate, is the issue of whether racial remedies should be permitted to
overcome past harms and create a non-racial legal and social reality. This
Article does not aim to resolve whether colorblindness is a good norm or is a
willful means to protect white supremacy. My goal here is much more
modest: I aim to point out a deep omission in the family law canon.
Many social scientists have studied the persistence of the notion of
colorblindness. Some attribute the desire of many people to see this society
as post-racial to the absolution of racial guilt. In other words, some argue that
white people may embrace colorblindness because it absolves them of guilt,
even though, in reality, discrimination, racism, and othering processes
exist.297 A corollary argument is that the belief in a colorblind society makes
it easier for people to believe that they are doing their part for race relations,
even though they do not live among, go to school among, socialize among, or
work alongside African-Americans. This has been described as the
"production of white innocence [that is necessary] for the realization of a
'post-racial' ... politic." 298 And, as Haney L6pez argues, colorblind
governmental policies ostensibly facilitate the defense of racially privileged
296 Id. at 828 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In coming to this conclusion, Breyer found
evidence of race-consciousness in over fifty-one federal statutes that used racial
classifications, over 100 state statutes, actions of presidential administrations for the past
half-century, and actions of local school districts. Id. at 828-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
297 "Othering" refers to using the other to define oneself. See Shani King,
Challenging MonoHumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think About
Intercountry Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 413, 426 & n.52 (2009). One of the first
proponents of this idea was the German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel. See G.W.F. HEGEL,
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 214-67 (J. B. Baillie trans., rev. 2d ed. 1949). In more
recent times, this term has been adopted by post-colonialist scholars to critique analytical
structures "that identify previously colonized peoples through binary opposition
structures that reflect a hierarchical inferiority." King, supra, at 426. And, "[a]ccording to
[those] analytical structures, the post-colonial is an antipodal and lesser 'other,' essential
for creating the Western identity of 'self' as the normative center." Id. Edward Said's
book, Orientalism, is generally accepted as the founding work of post-colonial studies.
Id. at n.5 1. Post-colonialist approaches have been used to analyze intercountry adoption,
see, e.g., id. at 426-52 (using a post-colonialist framework to critique law review
discourse on intercountry adoption), and the juvenile justice system, see, e.g., Kenneth B.
Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice
System, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 679, 682 (2002) (discussing "treatment of African American
children as the 'other' in the juvenile justice system").
298 Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: "Passing" Revisited and
Demystification As a Critical Practice, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 297, 339 (2000).
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stratification.299  Whatever its origins, colorblindness is becoming
institutionalized, which obscures context and power relations related to
race. 300 As a result, African-American families are broken up by family law
rules that ostensibly bear no relation to racism, as colorblindness allows for
rationalizations that reflect racial inequality as being the natural order of
things.30 1 After all, if we convince ourselves (as we did during the War on
Poverty) that racial inequality results from individual failings and not race,
we convince ourselves that racial inequality is acceptable. 30 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The family law canon determines what is considered family law. This, in
turn, affects the nature and the scope of family law debates among scholars
and practitioners. It determines which questions are legitimate questions in a
family law debate and shields certain laws and their effects from scrutiny.
Because of their very nature, canons are difficult to alter, but it is up to
professors, teachers, and scholars to transmit questions, doubts, and
arguments about the family law canon to colleagues and successive
generations of law students. 30 3
As discussed above, the family law canon fails to scrutinize race-based
disparities in laws, procedures, and outcomes, and that omission feeds a
mistaken notion of a race-blind or a post-racial society. One consequence of
this omission is that it obscures race-based decision making by legislatures,
judges, legal reform organizations, legal scholars, lawyers, and child welfare
workers, and thereby immunizes race-based decision making from scrutiny.
In other words, since the family law canon inaccurately describes family law
as post-racial, or colorblind, the canon immunizes racism and perpetuates
racial inequality.
299 Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 1, at 1041, 1064-65.
300 Id. at 1061.
301 See id. at 1064-65.
302 Some argue that African-Americans who refuse to move beyond racism and get
on with their lives are engaging in self-defeating "victimology," and have characterized
blacks refusing to get beyond race as engaging in "therapeutic alienation: alienation
unconnected to, or vastly disproportionate to, real-life stimulus, but maintained because it
reinforces one's sense of psychological legitimacy, via defining oneself against an
oppressor characterized as eternally depraved." JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE
RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA 1-49 (2000); JOHN MCWHORTER, WINNING
THE RACE: BEYOND THE CRISIS IN BLACK AMERICA 6 (2005); see also SHELBY STEELE,
THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 45 (1990).
These are complicated psychological and sociological phenomenon that this Article will
not address at length.
303 See Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 13, at 898-99.
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The race question is so important to discuss honestly in the context of
family law scholarship and education because of the power of attorneys in
the United States and the impact that their work can have on the lives of
families. On one level, of the three branches of government, the Judiciary is
almost exclusively comprised of attorneys. And on the other, it is largely
attorneys who pass laws in the Legislative Branch, lobby to get these laws
changed, challenge the constitutionality of these laws, and represent the
families who are subject to these laws.
Challenging the canon will highlight its colorblind perspective and reveal
the extent to which precedent allows color consciousness in family law,
whether it is a situation in which not acknowledging the role of race in
family law perpetuates racial inequality, or it is a situation in which not
acknowledging the role of race means not fully considering the best interests
of children. Challenging the canon will call attention to the ways in which
race is still a significant factor in society, in how people arrange their private
lives and families, and in the law that governs these families.
Challenging the canon will help us have an honest discussion about the
race-consciousness that is currently present in family law and in lesson plans,
scholarship, and casebooks. For example, what racial ideologies are being
promoted in these materials? Ones that support certain forms of race
blindness, while allowing other forms of race-consciousness? For instance,
blindness regarding the adoption of minority children, but race-consciousness
regarding the adoption of white children? Or more pointedly, why do
casebooks reject references to biology, but encourage discussion of culture-
as in, the culture of poverty? Is the colorblindness in family law the
"reactionary colorblindness," discussed by Ian Haney L6pez, which is the
result of a reactionary ideology of group difference that has been invoked to
"utterly displace any attention to the on-going dynamic of status
subordination and the continued necessity of social reconstruction"? 30 4 In
other words, are our family law casebooks a tool in the promulgation of
colorblindness as a specific racial ideology?
For now, professors and scholars should challenge the canon for the
benefit of honest academic debate and for the families for whom canons have
real consequences. The longer we refuse to include the "American
Dilemma" 30 5 in conversations about family law, the longer we will continue
to promote racial inequality.
304 Haney Lrpez, "A Nation of Minorities ", supra note 14, at 1011.
305 This term was coined by Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist, and is taken to
refer to historical and current race-based oppression of blacks by whites. See generally
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1944).
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Thus, this author invites legal scholars to continue this dialogue. While
legal scholars surely reflect on the canon in the process of creating lesson
plans, producing scholarship, and compiling casebooks, the decisions they
make throughout the process are implicit-we can only see the product of
their deliberations. This author's hope is that we can continue, as family law
scholars, to contribute to this process in an explicit way so that we
understand exactly how we are transmitting the canon to our students and our
successors. It is up to us to reshape the family law canon through our
scholarship and teaching. We cannot, after all, change judicial decisions or
modify or repeal statutes by individual fiat. Thus, it is our scholarship and
our teaching that will shape how future generations of lawyers talk, think,
and understand the law that governs families. Introspection of this sort may
result in a more race-conscious approach for family law casebooks that does
not obscure the connection between race and family law. One form this may
take is a new set of chapters within family law textbooks on race and the
family. Such chapters might, for instance, explicitly bring forward the theme
that we have moved from explicitly racist laws to laws that have racialized
content that is more subtle and hidden, but nevertheless should be of concern
to lawyers and scholars.
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
APPENDIX: A FEW SUGGESTED TEACHING MATERIALS TO CONTRIBUTE
TO A RACE-CONSCIOUS FAMILY LAW CANON
1. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877 (1988).
2. HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM,
1750-1925 (1976).
3. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003).
4. RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF
RACE AND ROMANCE (2001).
5. KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM:
PLAYING THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR (2001).
6. JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (2d ed. 2001)
(Appendix A: Three Systems of Family Law: A Preliminary Historical
Investigation).
7. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002).
8. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A
BLACK COMMUNITY (1974).
9. R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents'
Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J.
875 (1998).
10. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of
Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991).
11. Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court
Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453 (2002).
12. Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family
Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. 187 (1987).
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13. Peggy C. Davis & Richard G. Dudley, Jr., The Black Family in Modern
Slavery, 4 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 9 (1987).
14. Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune, New
Lyrics?, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 389 (2004).
15. Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541 (2001).
16. Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2010).
17. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825
(2004).
18. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education and Missouri
Jurisprudence: Shelley v. Kraemer in a Historical Perspective, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 673 (1989).
19. Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Redefining the Transracial Adoption
Controversy, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131 (1995).
20. R.A. Lenhardt, Forgotten Lessons on Race, Law, and Marriage: The
Story of Perez v. Sharp, in RACE LAW STORIES 343 (Rachel F. Moran &
Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008).
21. Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLuM. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (2008).
22. David D. Meyer, Lecture, Palmore Comes of Age: The Place of Race in
the Placement of Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 183 (2007).
23. Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences,
2007 WIs. L. REV. 239 (2007).
24. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Refraining the Legal
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385
(2008).
25. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided:
The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
231 (2009).
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26. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform's
Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV.
1647 (2005).
27. Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and
the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-1991).
28. Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare
Policy, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63 (1999).
29. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
30. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
31. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
32. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
33. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471(1970).
34. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
